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Executive Summary 
This case study provides an overview of how cooperation on a large joint project could be 
implemented. It seeks to make the descriptions as close to reality, hands-on and practical as 
possible. That said, the case is not an actually ongoing case, but should be seen as a potential project 
idea. 
The joint project consists of a 1000 MW offshore wind park located on Dutch territory, to be 
connected to an offshore hub on Belgian territory. Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK will together 
undertake the joint project and share the production and the RES benefits. Belgium will be the driving 
force of the joint project, organising the necessary negotiations and initiatives. The country will also 
assume most risks related to the development of the wind park. Therefore, we assume that the joint 
project will be shared in the following way: 40% to Belgium, 30% to the Netherlands, and 30% to 
the UK. We further assume that Belgium can achieve to involve Luxembourg into the project via 
statistical transfers, corresponding to 10% of the project. 
Because of the first mover character of such a joint project in the North Sea, with offshore electricity 
production connected to several countries, we discuss in detail the implications of the set-up and the 
cooperation. We assume that the countries cooperate on the joint project, but not on their support 
schemes. The latter aspect might follow in a second step. 
We show that all involved countries can benefit from the joint project. Belgium benefits from 
gaining access to additional wind resources, which will help meeting its ambitious RES target. The 
Netherlands will benefit from the connection of the wind park to the Belgian offshore hub. This will be 
at lower cost than a connection to Dutch shore – in return, the Netherlands will though only receive 
30% of the wind production as compared to own development at the same site. The UK will gain an 
option on additional offshore wind resources that may be at competitive prices. Luxembourg might 
have a benefit from using a concrete joint project for the import of RES benefits, as they are more 
tangible than for e.g. technology-neutral, ‘pure’ statistical transfers. 
 
Please note that this study serves as an example for the potential set-up, issues and solutions of joint 
offshore wind projects in an offshore grid. This is case is highly hypothetical. The Netherlands is 
already developing the Borssele site for offshore wind, according to the Dutch Energy Agreement 
and, more specifically, the agreements on offshore wind and the offshore grid. 
  
  
 
ECOFYS Germany GmbH | Am Karlsbad 11 | 10785 Berlin | T +49 (0)30 29773579-0 | F +49 (0)30 29773579-99 | E info@ecofys.com | I www.ecofys.com 
Table of contents 
1 Setting 1 
1.1 Description of the case 1 
1.2 Design characteristics 2 
1.3 Effects of building the offshore wind farm at Borssele 7 
2 Costs and benefits 8 
2.1 Benefit of the joint solution as compared to purely national initiatives 8 
2.2 Identifying the different cost and benefit elements 9 
2.3 Transfers and compensation: creating a win-win situation 11 
3 Potential obstacles and how to overcome them 14 
3.1 Pricing the option 14 
3.2 Electricity market integration and power flows 14 
3.3 The issue of different stakeholders involved 15 
3.4 Non-compliance risks 16 
3.5 Public opinion 16 
3.6 State aid issues 17 
3.7 Other legal barriers 18 
4 Practical arrangements 19 
4.1 Concrete contractual requirements between countries 19 
4.2 Permits and licensing 20 
4.3 Finding the project developer 20 
4.4 Grid Access 21 
4.5 Granting of renewable support 21 
4.6 Suggested amendments to national renewable energy laws 21 
4.6.1 Belgium 22 
4.6.2 The Netherlands 23 
4.6.3 The UK 24 
4.6.4 Luxembourg 25 
4.7 Notification to the European Commission 26 
5 Potential implementation process & timing 27 
5.1 Ambitious time plan: Operation until 2020 27 
5.2 Alternative time plan: Operation before 2030 28 
6 Conclusions 29 
  
 
ECOFYS Germany GmbH | Am Karlsbad 11 | 10785 Berlin | T +49 (0)30 29773579-0 | F +49 (0)30 29773579-99 | E info@ecofys.com | I www.ecofys.com 
APPENDIX A: Proposed Template Agreement for a Joint Project between Belgium, the 
Netherlands and the UK 30 
APPENDIX B: Proposed Template Agreement for a statistical transfer between Belgium and 
Luxemburg 45 
APPENDIX C: Alternative Template Agreement for a statistical transfer between Belgium 
and the UK (if not included in the Joint Project Agreement) 52 
APPENDIX D: Alternative Template Agreement for a statistical transfer between Belgium 
and the Netherlands (if not included in the Joint Project Agreement) 60 
 
 DESNL13116 1 
1 Setting 
1.1 Description of the case 
The technical set-up of this case is aligned with a related case study currently being undertaken in 
the NorthSeaGrid project (www.northseagrid.info). It comprises a joint offshore wind project of 1000 
MW, located in the Borssele area on Dutch 
territory. The project is expected to 
exploit two offshore hubs that Belgium is 
in the process of planning on its territory. 
The eastern offshore hub will be the major 
connection point for the joint offshore 
wind park. From the hubs, there will be 
interconnectors to Belgium (a line of ca. 
30 km at 900 MW), to the Netherlands (a 
line of ca. 50 km at 1500 MW), and to the 
UK (a line of ca. 110 km at 1000 MW). It 
is assumed that part of these 
interconnectors can be used for the export 
of wind power from the joint project, 
while the remaining part will be used as a 
market interconnection. 
We assume that Belgium is the driving 
force behind the development of the joint 
project. The Belgium federal government is willing to proceed with the development of the 1000 MW 
wind park including commitment to respective support payments. It will also coordinate the scope of 
involvement of the other Member States in the project. 
The Netherlands would have to make the site available for the joint project. There is a natural 
reluctance towards this, as the Netherlands considers the site to be important for future own 
developments of offshore wind. We therefore assume that a compensation mechanism needs to be 
established. 
The UK is interested in the joint project if electricity from renewables can be generated at a 
competitive price as compared to their domestic sources. Due to national legislation, the UK would 
require a physical import of the electricity from the joint project if it should be eligible for support. 
The UK is not interested in statistical transfers only. 
Other, not physically connected countries could be interested to participate in the joint project based 
on statistical transfers. In our case, we use the example of Luxembourg, who is willing to purchase 
virtual RES benefits that count towards its renewable target.  
Figure 1: Setting of the joint project in the offshore grid 
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1.2 Design characteristics 
Due to the first-mover character of the project, we pursue what can be called a semi-integrated 
strategy for the cooperation, in which Belgium is the main driver of the joint project, being the sole 
contractual partner with the wind park investor and assuming most of the risks related to the project 
in the first place. In practice, this means that Belgium will drive the development of the wind park 
with the project developer and overtake the obligation to support the wind park fully, in case no 
offtake agreement can be established with the Netherlands and the UK.  
We find this cooperative, but semi-integrated strategy most realistic for such a first-mover project, 
assuming that a more integrated strategy can only be established after a first project has 
demonstrated the viability of joint offshore wind projects in the North Sea. A more integrated 
strategy could be one in which the participating countries also cooperate in the contacts towards the 
wind park investor. This would entail, for instance, the setting up of a joint fund from which the 
support payments can be paid out. Such strategy could be beneficial if a large scope of cooperation is 
envisaged for the future, e.g. including several wind parks across the North Sea. However, currently 
Member States seem to be reluctant to establish such related fund and to follow this integrated 
approach. 
Specific design characteristics of the cooperation 
Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK sign a joint project agreement that establishes a minimum 
cooperation between the countries. This will give Belgium access to the Borssele site, on which the 
wind park shall be built, as well as right of way for respective connection cables to the offshore hub. 
It will also regulate the conditions for the issuance of permits and licenses between Belgium and the 
Netherlands. These shall be agreed within a specially established ‘Responsible Body’, consisting of at 
least one representative of each party from relevant Belgian and Dutch authorities. Specific 
conditions for the permit are agreed upon amicably between the countries. In addition, the 
Netherlands and the UK get the right, but not the obligation, to each off-take 30% of the total wind 
energy production from the wind park, corresponding to 300 MW maximum production.  
As a first step, the wind park will be integrated into the Belgium support scheme (Belgium prefers the 
use of its own support scheme instead of setting up a separate scheme). In the current policy 
framework, the offshore wind park will receive one green certificate1 per generated MWh from the 
Federal Electricity Regulatory Authority (CREG). The federal grid operator (ELIA) is obliged to 
purchase the green certificates for a period of 20 years at a minimum price of 107 EUR per certificate 
for electricity generated resulting from the first 216 MW of installed capacity and of 90 EUR per 
certificate above that (Art. 14, Arrêté royal du 16 juillet 2002).  
                                              
1 Belgium’s support scheme might be changed into a (sliding) premium scheme with competitive pricing. However, considerations are 
ongoing, which is why we make reference to the existing scheme. 
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If the Netherlands or the UK will make use of the option after having made a direct agreement with 
the wind park operator on support payments, the respective part of the wind park will then not be 
supported through the Belgium support scheme anymore. 
Also in the Netherlands and in the UK, the wind park shall be integrated into the existing support 
schemes (again, this reflects the preference of both countries). In practice, this means that the 
Netherlands will allow the project investor to participate with a capacity of up to 300 MW in SDE+ 
rounds. Should the wind park not win any contract within the normal SDE+ rounds, then the 300 MW 
(or 30% of the production of the wind park) will remain integrated in the Belgian support scheme. 
Should the wind park have won a contract under the Dutch SDE+ scheme, then after the end of the 
support period (after 15 years), this part of the wind park will not be eligible for support in any other 
country. In the UK, the wind park operator will be eligible to bid for a Contract-for Difference (CfD) 
for up to 300 MW (or 30%). Again, should the wind park investor and the UK not come to an 
agreement, then this share will continue to be supported under the Belgian scheme. 
In practice, one can say that in this set-up, each country will consider part of the wind park as just 
another RES installation within their territory. The project will only be granted support if it is 
competitive with other RES sources within the respective country. This way, the level of cooperation, 
compensation payments between countries and necessary changes in national laws are minimised. In 
later stages (e.g. once a first project has shown the feasibility joint projects in the North Sea), more 
integrated solutions, e.g. including a joint support scheme, could be pursued (also see the task 5 
report of this project, Busch et al. forthcoming). This will result in a less complicated set-up for the 
joint project, but require more cooperation and changes in regulations and laws. 
The agreement between Belgium and the project investor will include a commitment by the project 
developer to bid into the UK CfD scheme and the Dutch SDE+ scheme at a level corresponding to the 
support given under the Belgian scheme2. This shall incentivise the project developer in enforcing 
cooperation within the joint project and decrease the risk that Belgium would have to support the full 
1000MW project. At the same time, the risk for the project developer is minimised as they are 
ensured to receive the same support level as guaranteed by the Belgium government. If the project 
developer does not win any of the contracts with the UK or the Netherlands, they shall be obliged to 
bid into the schemes again in subsequent years, e.g. at least five times. The details of these 
obligations should already be described in the tender specifications. 
In addition to the cooperation between the neighbouring countries, Belgium might also want to utilise 
statistical transfers to diversify their risks. We assume that Belgium agrees with Luxembourg on the 
sale of up to 10% of the generated RES benefits for an agreed period, e.g. 5 years or even 20 years, 
at a price negotiated between the two countries (see section 2.3 below). 
                                              
2 The ‘corresponding support level’ would need to be defined in more detail. In principle, it should be ensured that the income for the wind 
park operator remains the same. The actual support level required in the other countries will thus also depend on the respective market 
prices, potential grid access costs and costs of capacity bookings on interconnectors that the wind park operator might incur. 
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Transfer of RES benefits 
Each country shall receive an amount of RES benefits for target achievement from the project that 
directly corresponds to the amount of RES electricity supported by that country. Since the wind park 
is located on Dutch territory, the RES benefits are in the first instance automatically accredited to the 
Netherlands. We suggest that the joint project agreement between the Netherlands and Belgium 
includes an immediate transfer of all RES benefits to Belgium in the first place, at a price to be 
determined (see below). Then, in line with the (potentially) successful agreement between wind farm 
operator and the Netherlands and the UK, respectively, Belgium will further transfer the RES benefits 
to the respective countries according to the production measured at the feed-in point of the wind 
park at the Belgian offshore hub, at a price to be determined (see section 2.3 below). 
Market access and physical flows 
The wind park will need market access to at least one country’s power market to sell the generated 
electricity. This shall include future, spot and balancing markets. Market access and regulations for a 
wind park feeding into an interconnector rather than directly into a national market are not yet 
determined. 
With the ongoing creation of the internal electricity market in Europe, the UK, the Netherlands and 
Belgium are all part of a single market, with price coupling. Flow directions on the interconnector thus 
depend on price differences between market areas. The flow directions are, in the normal market set-
up with implicit capacity auctions, not predictable or controllable by single actors like a wind park 
operator. It is a regulatory question of how to deal with the volumes generated by the wind park, and 
into which market area the volumes should be integrated.  
In general, there are several options on how to organise the market access for a wind park in an 
offshore grid, as discussed by NSCOGI (2013)3 and by Kitzing and Schröder (2012)4. Following the 
conclusions by NSCOGI, we assume that in the first instance, the future offshore hub system will not 
have an own market price area, but the wind park will be allocated to the respective country market 
areas5. Here, even if connected to different price zones at the same time, the wind park should not 
be allowed to choose between markets to avoid cherry-picking problems, which could especially be 
an issue with sliding premium support mechanisms.  
Concretely, the market arrangements for the wind park also depend strongly on the arrangements for 
the grid infrastructure. We assume that the wind park investor will be responsible for connecting the 
wind park to the offshore hub. The connection between the offshore hub and the Belgian electricity 
grid will most likely be defined as a domestic connection line, where it is likely that the wind park has 
                                              
3 The North Seas Countries’ Offshore Grid Initiative, Discussion Paper: Possible Market Arrangements for Integrated Offshore Networks 
www.benelux.int/files/5613/9702/3931/options.pdf 
4 Kitzing, L and Schröder, ST, 2012, Regulating future offshore grids: economic impact analysis on wind parks and transmission system 
operators, European University Institute, RSCAS 2012-65, http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/24679/RSCAS_2012_65.pdf 
5 Note that the solution where the wind farms would form their own market area is also being further investigated by NSCOGI. 
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to cover part of the construction cost, whatever applicable. Then, the wind park will have direct 
market access into the Belgian electricity market at its market access point at the offshore hub. 
This is less clear for the market access to the UK and to the Netherlands: Here, the connection 
between the onshore electricity grid and the offshore hub is most likely to be defined as a trans-
national interconnector. NSCOGI discusses several options of how to grant market access for a wind 
park through an interconnector. The preferred options are that the wind park will be granted a ‘virtual 
grid connection’ on the interconnector, at each point in time amounting to the capacity of foreseen 
actual generation per share. This means that the wind power production receives priority over other 
flows on the interconnector and the transfer flows between markets might be reduced by the 
respective wind power flows. It might be a requirement that the wind park has to book and pay for 
the used capacity on the interconnector in order to compensate the operator of the interconnector for 
the lost congestion rents. This is especially relevant if the interconnector is built and operated by 
merchant third parties rather than national TSOs. In such case, it might become difficult for the wind 
park to make competitive bids on the markets due to the increased marginal costs. 
Alternatively, the wind park might be granted market access directly at the offshore hub, for each 
market according to the share that is supported in the respective country. In this case, part of the 
interconnector will be redefined as ‘domestic’ cable and no capacity bookings will be necessary. This 
way, also issues with adverse flows through the interconnector could be reduced. This suggested 
solution is illustrated in Figure 2:  
 
Figure 2: Virtual split of the joint project and direct market access into all respective power markets 
While the wind park is located in the Netherlands, it is connected via the offshore hub on Belgian 
territory. It is, however, not yet clear if the market areas can easily be extended into foreign 
countries (i.e. the UK market would then reach into Belgian territory) and what the practical 
implications might be related to that. Further legal investigations will be required. 
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In a first instance, we assume that the Belgian TSO ELIA will be responsible for imbalance 
settlements. The wind park will become part of the Belgian balancing market. With direct access of 
the wind park to the UK and Dutch electricity markets, this first assumption might however have to 
be revisited. 
The market access to the UK and the Netherlands is necessary because both countries grant support 
in form of sliding premium schemes. Therefore, the reference market price, from which the sliding 
premium is determined, should coincide with the actual market income of the wind park. This might, 
however, be circumvented if a country would accept a foreign reference price in their support system, 
for instance, if the Netherlands accepted a Belgian reference price as basis for the sliding premium 
under the SDE+ scheme. If the Netherlands also accepted that the electricity does not have to be 
physically imported, then the joint project can be planned without direct access to the Dutch market. 
However, this requires a change in current Dutch regulation in relation to the opening up of the SDE+ 
scheme for ‘external’ production. Moreover, if the average electricity prices structurally differed 
between Belgium and the Netherlands, the resulting changes in premium payments might have to be 
reflected in a compensation mechanism. 
The UK, on the other hand, currently requires that all electricity eligible for support under the British 
renewable support scheme is physically fed into the British electricity system. Because of the implicit 
capacity allocations on the interconnectors and the actual physical flows which can deviate from this 
capacity allocation, this requirement might become an issue. For this case study, we assume that the 
physical feed-in of the wind park at the offshore hub is sufficient prove of delivery to the UK, if the 
market area is extended to reach to the offshore hub and the part of the interconnector used by the 
wind park is deemed a ‘domestic’ connection. This will, however, also require changes in legislation. 
Alternatively, the UK could also decide to relax the restriction on physical import. This is further 
discussed in section 3.2. 
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1.3 Effects of building the offshore wind farm at Borssele 
The Borssele area was assessed by the Dutch government in their 2009 ‘Policy Document on the 
North Sea’6 as follows: 
Borssele area 
At least 1,000 MW can be realised in this 344 km2 area. 
It is a reasonably favourable area off the Zeeland coast (Walcheren): little shipping traffic, 
limited water depth and middle category in terms of distance to the coast. Landing 
provisions exist at Borssele. 
Points of attention for creation of the area Borssele wind farm  
1 The area overlaps with a potentially ecologically valuable area in the southeast 
(Zeeland Banks). Although its natural values appear limited, further studies will take 
place as part of Natura 2000 and MSFD until 2012. Based on those studies, further 
conditions and/or limitations may be imposed on the construction of wind farms in this 
area.  
2 There is a relatively high cable and pipe density in the area, which may mean that not 
the entire surface area is available for wind turbines.  
3 Incorporation of generated capacity in the national electricity grid is limited to a 
maximum of 1,000 MW. The area is far removed from the electricity grid, which is 
extremely unfavourable for the development of the Dutch electricity grid. The 
realisation of wind farms in this area will require high investments in the grid 
infrastructure for landing points for wind energy.  
4 The area is also a search area for a multifunctional island for energy storage and 
production that may be constructed there. 
 
Effect on Assessment (see1) 
Shipping Increased risk of collision, but controllable 
Oil and gas recovery No effect 
Sand extraction 5% more expensive if extracted outside 12-mile 
zone 
Defence No effect (not currently used as military site) 
Fishing Possibilities for shared used by sustainable fishing 
to be investigated 
Nature In extreme south east (Zeeland Banks), detrimental 
effects possible. 
 
The North Sea is one of the busiest seas in the world, with over 110,000 shipping movements to and 
from Dutch seaports each year1. The value of ocean transport to the Dutch economy is great. When 
the wind farm at Borssele is constructed, a safe distance of two nautical miles between the wind farm 
                                              
6 http://www.noordzeeloket.nl/en/Images/Policy%20Document%20on%20the%20North%20Sea%202010-2015_931.pdf  
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and shipping routes would be created. Shipping within the wind farm and in the 500-metre safety 
zone around it will be prohibited. This will affect current shipping movements, as can be seen from 
Figure 3 below: 
 
Figure 3: Utilisation of Borssele site (shipping movements) 
Contrary to the assumptions in the above mentioned assessment, we assume that the joint project is 
connected not to the Dutch shore, but to a Belgian offshore hub. This eliminates the grid integration 
issues mentioned in the Dutch assessment above. 
2 Costs and benefits 
In the following cost assessment, we assume that all partners described above are part of the joint 
project, i.e. that the wind farm operator has concluded contracts with Belgium, the Netherlands and 
the UK on support payments. Belgium and Luxembourg have agreed on statistical transfers. 
2.1 Benefit of the joint solution as compared to purely national initiatives 
This case study uses the synergies with the NorthSeaGrid project (www.northseagrid.info). The 
NorthSeaGrid project is currently undertaking an economic assessment of the benefits of jointly 
developing the grid infrastructure, including offshore hubs and a connection to an offshore wind park 
for a UK-Benelux-case (Case 2)7. We use this case as basis for the joint project here. 
The NorthSeaGrid project selected this case based on a preliminary assessment of the overall 
benefits of an integrated solution as compared to purely national initiatives (e.g. the cost benefits 
from interconnection through a joint offshore hub rather than shore-to-shore). The NorthSeaGrid 
case will include a detailed cost inventory of the case, a quantification of the benefits, different 
models for cost and benefit allocations, and more. 
                                              
7 www.northseagrid.info/project-description 
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The focus of this case study here lies on the practical implementation issues of a joint wind park 
project within that common offshore infrastructure. It focuses on the set-up and the cooperation 
options. Our starting point of analysis is the assumption that the common grid infrastructure and the 
formation of an interconnected offshore hub are deemed beneficial and respective grid investments 
will be undertaken by the involved actors. The wind park on Dutch territory that shall be connected to 
the offshore hub (on Belgian territory) is subject to our further investigation. 
We show in the following, how a joint project can be created in which all involved countries can 
benefit from the wind park development. 
2.2 Identifying the different cost and benefit elements 
We begin by identifying the most relevant cost and benefit elements and determine, in which 
countries they show most effect (in some cases roughly). Subsequently, we compare them to each 
other and estimate the requirement for compensation payments. 
 BE NL UK LUX 
Shares of RES 
Electricity from the wind park 40% 30% 30% - 
RES benefits for targets 30% 30% 30% 10% 
Direct Effect 
Support cost to wind park 40% 30% 30% - 
Payment from statistical transfers -10%   10% 
Infrastructure cost (interconnection) 40% 20% 40% - 
Indirect Side Effects 
System integration costs 
Grid related costs 
Ancillary service costs 
Impact on conv. capacity 
40% 
 
 
 
30% 
 
 
 
30% 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
Displaced alternative utilisation of area  100%   
Biodiversity and landscape costs - 100% - - 
Avoided local air pollution 40% 30% 30% - 
Greenhouse gas savings 40% 30% 30% - 
Security of supply 40% 30% 30% - 
Employment effects Allocation uncertain, depending on contracts 
Innovation effects Allocation uncertain 
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With market access directly at the offshore hub, the wind park operator will sell the respective share 
of the production directly into the respective market, i.e. 30% of the produced electricity from the 
wind farm will be sold on the British market, 30% will be sold on the Dutch market, and 40% will be 
sold into Belgium. This does not necessarily correspond to a physical flow of the same shares into 
each system. For simplicity, we assume that once all interconnectors are in place (the cost of which 
are discussed below), on average, the shares of physical flows do not deviate significantly from the 
shares of production sold at each market. This means that the flow of electricity, and therewith also 
the cost of system integration (including onshore grid reinforcement, balancing, impact on 
conventional capacity etc.), the security of supply effect (in terms of providing electricity from local 
sources), and the effect on greenhouse gas savings and local air pollution (by replacing conventional 
electricity generation technology) correspond directly to the share of support paid. Of course, there 
might be differences in the level of e.g. balancing cost in the UK and the Netherlands, however, all 
other eligible renewable production of the same kind would cause the same costs, so these are not 
additional costs of the joint project and should not be part of compensation payment considerations. 
Other cost and benefit elements are unequally distributed and need to be further investigated. Most 
importantly, this relates to infrastructure costs. For a first rough estimation, we look at 
interconnection cable lengths and the maximum capacities that will be used by the wind park. Since 
we assume that the offshore grid infrastructure will be built independently of the joint project, the 
costs connected to the joint project arise from the lost opportunity of using the interconnector cables 
for transfer between markets. The costs are thus mainly lost income of congestion rents accrued by 
the respective operator of the interconnector (TSO or third party investor) and the corresponding 
‘stranded investment’ into the cable. The connection from the offshore hub to Belgium is 30km; and 
the full cable capacity of ca. 1000MW will be required (at least at first and while it is still uncertain 
whether the wind park receives support by the UK and the Netherlands). The interconnection from 
the offshore hub to the Netherlands is 50km; and 300MW are needed for the wind park at times of 
maximum production. The distance to the UK is 110km; and also here, 300MW can be attributed to 
the wind park. This corresponds to a rough cost distribution of 40%-20%-40%. Here, the UK has 
comparatively high cost and the Netherlands comparatively low cost. It has to be noted that a loss of 
income only occurs on that part of the interconnector, where the physical transfer flows are reduced 
by the flow from the wind park, i.e. in the direction of flow between markets. Since three countries 
are connected to the offshore hub, only one of the connections to the offshore hub will be affected at 
each time. With our simplified assumption from above (i.e. that on average the physical flows 
correspond to the RES support shares), all TSOs will be affected rather equally over a longer time 
horizon. However, it should be subject to further investigation if the impact on income can 
realistically be expected to be equal. 
The Netherlands incurs 100% of all cost related to the location of the wind farm. As mentioned 
above, the area is currently used for sand extraction and for shipping routes. A displacement of such 
alternative utilisation of the area may be costly for the Netherlands. Biodiversity and landscape cost 
could also be incurred, especially regarding the Zeeland Bank area, as mentioned above. We assume 
the costs from landscape effects (especially visual impacts) to be very limited, as the site is located 
well outside the 12-mile zone. 
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The amount and allocation of employment and innovation effects in each country depends on the 
number of contracts signed with equipment manufacturers and service providers. We assume that, 
based on competitive principles, procurement tenders will be undertaken by the TSO as well as the 
wind park investor. Companies from each of the countries may bid to win contracts. Installation and 
maintenance services, for instance, could be operated from several possible ports – the ones that can 
offer the best prices will win the contracts. Realistically, this will probably be either Dutch or Belgian 
ports.  
2.3 Transfers and compensation: creating a win-win situation 
The below figure illustrates broadly the transfers in the two separate phases of the joint project. 
 
In the first phase of the project, a joint project agreement is made between Belgium, the Netherlands 
and the UK, including access rights, procedures for granting permits and licenses, and the optional 
transfers of RES benefits generated by the wind park.  
The joint project agreement should include compensation payments from Belgium to the Netherlands 
that, in the first instance, should cover at least the following elements:  
1. displaced alternative utilisation of the area (sand extraction and shipping routes) 
2. biodiversity and landscape costs 
3. lost option value of using the site for Dutch offshore wind development 
No visual impacts or other adverse landscape effects are foreseen. If detrimental effects on Zeeland 
Bank can be excluded, for instance, from placing the wind farm in the north-west part of the Borssele 
site, the biodiversity and landscape costs  can be assumed to be around zero. We suggest that the 
Netherlands are compensated for their displaced alternative utilisation of the area (sand extraction 
and sipping routes), and for the lost option value of using the site for Dutch offshore wind 
development. We suggest these compensation payments to be directly linked to the amount of off-
taken electricity (in MWh annually). This will ensure that whenever the 300 MW of the wind park are 
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transferred into the Dutch scheme, the compensation payments are reduced accordingly. The 
compensation payments shall include all required payments, so that the statistical transfers do not 
have a separate price. 
In the second phase, when the wind park operator has concluded support agreements with the 
Netherlands and the UK, the RES benefits must be transferred according to the share of support that 
each of the participating countries has taken over.  
In this phase, the optional transfers from the joint project agreement are activated. Between Belgium 
and the Netherlands, all cost allocation is done through the compensation payments. We thus 
suggest simple netting out of the RES benefit volumes, so that the RES benefits are transferred at 
the same net ‘price’ in both directions. It should though be noted that the Netherlands incur a 
relatively low interconnection cost as compared to the other two countries. Additionally, the wind 
farm might bid into the Dutch scheme at relatively low cost as compared to a comparable domestic 
development, because of the shorter connection cost (to the offshore hub as compared to Dutch 
shore) and because of the securities placed by the Belgian government (‘fall-back’ option into Belgian 
support scheme). If the Netherlands have incurred a benefit there, it might be reasonable that this 
benefit is shared in some way, for instance, through a reduction of the compensation payments. 
In regards to the UK, the incurred costs for the RES development are already relatively high, because 
of the long interconnector. In principle, Belgium could be compensated somewhat for assuming the 
risk of developing the wind park in the first instance and providing the fall-back guarantee on support 
payments. Since this is however in the interest of Belgium, we do not find additional reasoning for 
compensation payments between the two countries. We therefore suggest setting the price of the 
transfers of RES benefits between Belgium and the UK to zero, or to a symbolic 1 EUR per year (this 
is assuming that neither of the countries are more or less affected by physical flows or income loss 
than their share of the project). 
In regards of the statistical transfer from Belgium to Luxembourg, the contract would include a 
project-specific transfer of RES benefits. In principle, one could also imagine that statistical transfers 
are made on a more abstract, technology-neutral level. However, in this case, the production 
volumes and the price shall be directly linked to the joint project. Therefore, we suggest agreeing on 
volumes in terms of a certain percentage of the annual production from the offshore wind park, i.e. 
10%. The price of the RES benefits could be directly linked to the amount Belgium pays for the 
support plus an ‘administration fee’ and a risk premium for Belgium. This way, the relation of 
Luxembourg to the offshore wind park becomes more immediate and tangible. Potential issues with 
this set-up could be that the annual volumes from the project for Luxembourg will be uncertain, as is 
the total payment from Luxembourg to Belgium. On the one hand, such varying payments might not 
be approved by parliament in Luxembourg, where at least a limit on maximum annual payments is 
expected. On the other hand, the benefit from having a share in a concrete project could be for 
Luxembourg to have a better chance of getting public support for the action, as a tangible production 
is connected to the payments. Even physically, some of the production might end up in the grid in 
Luxembourg. 
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Overall, all countries can benefit from the joint project. Belgium benefits from gaining access to 
additional wind resources, which will help meeting the ambitious RES targets. The Netherlands will 
benefit from the connection of the wind park to the Belgian offshore hub. This will be at lower cost 
than a connection to Dutch shore – in return, the Netherlands will though only receive 30% of the 
wind production as compared to own development at the same site. The UK will gain an option on 
additional offshore wind resources which might be at competitive prices. Luxembourg might have a 
benefit from using a concrete joint project for the import of RES benefits, as they are more tangible 
than for e.g. technology-neutral, ‘pure’ statistical transfers. The following table summarises some of 
the economic benefits and risks of the cooperation: 
Table 1: Overview of economic benefits and risks for entering into the joint project  
 BE NL UK LUX 
Benefits - access to 
additional offshore 
wind on Dutch 
territory 
- savings on 
connection cost 
(wind park 
connected to 
offshore hub 
instead of 
Dutch shore) 
- option on 
300MW 
offshore wind at 
comparably low 
cost 
- option on 
300MW 
offshore wind at 
competitive 
cost 
- option on RES 
benefits from 
100MW 
offshore wind 
development 
Risks - Might end up with 
having to support 
the full 1000MW 
project 
- Lost 
opportunity to 
develop the full 
1000MW on 
Borssele site 
- Lower 
interconnection 
capacity to 
offshore hub 
and lost income 
from congestion 
rents 
- Lower 
interconnection 
capacity to 
offshore hub 
and lost income 
from congestion 
rents 
- Volumes on 
RES benefits 
are more 
uncertain than 
with a 
technology-
neutral 
statistical 
transfer 
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3 Potential obstacles and how to overcome them 
3.1 Pricing the option 
The joint project agreement will include a compensation payment to the Netherlands regarding the 
lost option value of using the site for Dutch offshore wind development. 
It may be difficult for the Netherlands to put a price on this lost option, especially since there is still 
discussion regarding the 2030 renewables targets and uncertainty about further developments 
afterwards. Also, due to unforeseen developments in other renewable energy technologies, more or 
less offshore wind might be required even if national targets are defined. As a consequence, the 
Netherlands might be reluctant to give up the site and might either not want to grant the site to the 
joint project at all or only at a high premium. The option to ‘buy back’ 30% of the wind park if 
desired should act as partial mitigation measure.  
Additionally, the joint project agreement could include a clause that opens up for additional 
cooperation and new joint projects, also on Belgian territory, where the Netherlands could get access 
to additional offshore wind production, up to a total of 700 MW, so that no loss in option value 
occurs. In this case, Belgium would pay the Netherlands for giving up the options of offshore 
development at the Borssele site with an additional option of offshore development elsewhere. Of 
course, the conditions need to be somewhat comparable and potentially the amount might have to be 
adjusted accordingly. 
3.2 Electricity market integration and power flows 
The issue of market access and physical flows has been discussed in some detail in section 1.2. There 
are still some open questions related to this issue, especially in the area of where market access can 
and best should be granted as well as what the consequences would be. The current requirement of 
physical import of RES electricity into the British electricity system poses additional challenges. In the 
ongoing discussions with Ireland, this issue was ‘worked around’ as there the joint project is 
envisaged to have a direct connection to the British grid only without access to the Irish system. This 
way, all volumes generated by the joint project would automatically be proven to be imported. Our 
case is significantly more complicated than that and thus some open issues remain related to the 
import requirement.  
If the wind park got its UK market access point directly at the offshore hub, it could feed into the 
British system from there. Delivery into the UK system would be implicitly proven, no matter into 
which direction the electricity flows on the interconnector. It is still an open issue if the UK can grant 
such a market access point on Belgian territory and if it would be possible to grant such a market 
access point at the offshore hub, where then three markets would be directly adjacent. 
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As the eligible volumes for the CfD support in the UK are (under the current framework) most 
probably connected to physical (measured) import volumes and not trading volumes, another issue 
could arise regarding volume determination. If the wind park would send production volumes to the 
UK via trades and capacity bookings, then these volumes would be traded volumes, which are not 
necessarily the exact production volumes, because of forecast errors, block sizes etc. However, 
accepting trading volumes as basis for RES support determination is common practice for other 
similar schemes (Germany, Denmark). It should also be noticed that in case of LECs8, the UK has 
previously accepted traded volumes and flows rather than physical flows to determine eligible 
volumes for support. If the UK accepted trading volumes as proof of import, then alternatively, also 
capacity bookings on an existing interconnector project (such as the NEMO cable) would be possible, 
so the joint project could be undertaken even if the UK’s direct connection to the offshore hub will not 
be realised. 
As there currently exists no regulation regarding electricity production in offshore grids, these 
considerations are currently still rather hypothetical and will most likely only be solved with the 
implementation of the first wind park in an offshore grid. Further investigations are required in order 
to give final answers on this issue. 
3.3 The issue of different stakeholders involved 
Potential obstacles could arise from the integration of the joint project into the newly developed 
offshore grid infrastructure. We assume that the interconnector construction is done separately to the 
joint project and creates value in itself. However, the joint project will affect the income on the 
interconnector. This poses a risk for the investors in the interconnectors, if they are not compensated 
for the loss. Potential compensation payments to the TSOs need thus to be investigated. However, if 
additional costs are imposed on the wind park, e.g. through capacity payments for the 
interconnector, this might affect the investment attractiveness of the wind park itself. Moreover, 
discrimination issues might arise if the offshore wind park has to cover more of the connection cost 
than a comparable offshore renewable producer in the respective countries. 
On the other hand, the TSOs might be affected differently from the wind park, depending on the 
prevailing flow of electricity through the interconnector lines. It might then be necessary to include 
these elements in the compensation payments between countries as part of the joint project 
agreement.  
Finally, there might be very different approaches required if one of the interconnectors is built on 
basis of a merchant approach (which is likely in the UK), as compared to national TSOs. 
 
                                              
8 Levy Exemption Certificates, issued under the Climate Change Levy 
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3.4 Non-compliance risks 
There are several different risks of non-compliance. All parties involved in the joint project could be 
subject to non-compliance. 
We have added sanctions for non-compliance in the template agreements in the appendix, e.g. if the 
host Member State fails to transfer the RES benefits in due time etc. Section 4.1 mentions the most 
important sanctions for the joint project agreement.  
Also, in the support agreements between the wind park operator and the different countries, 
sanctions are envisaged – however, these would not differ much from ‘normal’ RES producers. 
An important source of non-compliance issue could be interconnector downtime and related 
imbalances or sales losses on power markets for the wind park operator. With the suggested set-up 
as described in section 1.2, in which the market access points of the wind park are directly at the 
offshore hub, the risks should be minimal for the wind park operator – He will be only eligible for 
downtime on the connection from the wind park to the offshore hub, which we anyway suggest 
should be operated by the wind park operator himself. 
In general, much of operating and contractual risk should be covered as Belgium gives a guarantee to 
support the wind park 100% if no agreements with the other countries are made. So, there is a 
rather simple fall-back position for the wind park with stable income and a fixed support payment. All 
other contractual arrangements with the Netherlands and with the UK will increase the benefit for the 
joint project without risking a loss.  
3.5 Public opinion 
As with any other Cooperation Mechanism and potential support of RES outside a country’s own 
territory, there might arise public acceptance issues. The Netherlands are currently exploring options 
of ‘opening up’ the SDE+ scheme for RES production from abroad. However, the energy agreement 
from autumn 2013 still indicates a strong emphasis on domestic deployment, including offshore wind. 
In the UK, the current requirement to physically import all RES production that might be eligible for 
support also reflects the public opinion that whatever electricity is paid for by British consumers 
should also be consumed by them. With the set-up of a joint project within an offshore grid, this 
requirement is challenging, as it might require suboptimal capacity bookings – and not even then is 
the physical flow direction guaranteed. Such requirement should thus be revisited. It is as yet unclear 
what the public reaction might be. Here, a joint project that is actually connected to the UK grid via 
an interconnector seems though less challenging than, for instance, statistical transfers with a 
country on the other side of Europe. 
Belgium, in its here described role as driving force behind the joint project, will assume a large risk, 
as in the first phase of the project it will be yet unclear if the wind park operator will be able to agree 
with the UK and the Netherlands on respective support payment arrangements. If this is not the 
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case, Belgium will be left with the full wind park, both in terms of support payments and in terms of 
integration into the market and domestic grid. 
Luxembourg seeks statistical transfers. However, connecting the transfers to a specific project, 
especially an offshore wind park might lock Luxembourg in a position where they end up paying more 
for the RES benefits than absolutely necessary. There will be a trade-off between procuring the 
tangible RES benefits stemming from the joint project and a potential lower cost option. Both cases 
might have benefits and disadvantages in regards to public communication and will depend very 
much on the character and mood in the public discussion at the time of decision. 
3.6 State aid issues 
All Member States involved in this case study have a support scheme that has been notified and 
authorised as State aid. As in principle opening up the support scheme to installations in other 
Member States would not take away nor change the nature of the State aid involved but would only 
extend it to a wider range of beneficiaries one might consider such unproblematic from a State aid 
perspective, and one may as regards the compatibility assessment refer to the respective decisions of 
the European Commission. 
Still, it would – as State aid can only be authorised when necessary and proportionate – need to be 
ensured that the renewable energy installation in another Member State / the joint project will not 
receive financing from two Member States at the same time to such extent that it results in 
overcompensation. Thus it may be advisable to integrate a provision into the national renewable laws 
that no aid will be paid to a producer who for the same amount of energy already receives financial 
support from another Member State.  
However, certainly the changes would need to be notified to the European Commission. Further, one 
may note, that according to the Guidelines for Environmental and Energy Aid 2014-2020 as they 
have entered into force in July 2014, a change to an existing support scheme may trigger the need 
for its adaption to the provisions of the Guidelines (par. 251). Whereas the UK has recently received 
approval for its new support scheme under the new State aid rules, for the schemes of Belgium and 
the Netherlands there might be a need for certain adaptations. However, both of the latter already 
run schemes which comply with fundamental principles of the EEAG (tendered premiums or 
certificate scheme), so a systemic change will in fact not be needed9..This – in particular the related 
administrative efforts – may constitute a disincentive by itself. However, for this case study we 
assume that they all bring their support schemes in line with the Guidelines, and - as the case may 
be – all introduce some form of tendering, so that but for the amendments needed, there should be 
no further State aid concerns. 
                                              
9 Belgium’s support scheme might though be changed into a (sliding) premium scheme with competitive pricing. However, considerations 
are ongoing, which is why we make reference to the existing scheme. 
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As regards Luxemburg, there would be no change to the support scheme and no payments to any 
industry or undertaking foreseen, but under the contract for the statistical transfer Luxemburg 
merely pays a certain amount of money to the Belgian State. It has not been mentioned for what 
purposes Belgium is going to use that amount of money. Thus, there are for the moment no State aid 
concerns. 
3.7 Other legal barriers 
Directive 2009/28/EC in Art. 7 and 8 refers to the host Member State for doing the notifications on a 
joint project. However, in this case study, the Netherlands, as the host Member State, would not be 
the Member State where the electricity is fed into the grid and thus measured. This would be 
Belgium. So it would be more practical if Belgium could do the notifications, which however would sit 
uncomfortably with the provisions of the Directive. Thus here the provisions of the Directive pose a 
certain barrier.  
For the rest, no other legal barriers have been identified in the case study. The problem of the 
(potential) need to adapt the support schemes to the requirements set out in the Guidelines for 
Environmental and Energy Aid 2014-2020 when changing them has been mentioned above.  
In addition, there may be problems with the licensing it appears from the context, but those may be 
addressed in the contract for the joint project. Extraterritorial application of Belgian law however does 
not seem a suitable solution. A solution in this regard is suggested below, i.e. solving such issues in 
the tendering specifications, thus in the context of the Responsible Body wherein the Netherlands and 
Belgium may work together. 
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4 Practical arrangements 
4.1 Concrete contractual requirements between countries 
The following contracts are necessary for the undertaking of the joint project in the above described 
setting. 
 Agreement for a joint project between Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK 
 Agreement for a statistical transfer between Belgium and Luxemburg 
This assumes that the option for the transfer of RES benefits is directly described in the joint project 
agreement (as implemented in the template agreement in Appendix A). If this is not desired, also 
separate agreements on statistical transfers could be made (Appendices C and D). 
We also assume that the access to land and related compensation payments are fully described in the 
joint project agreement. Alternatively, also a separate land lease agreement could be made. 
Joint Project Agreement: 
Responsibilities of  
Belgium 
Responsibilities of  
the Netherlands 
Responsibilities of  
both 
Responsibilities 
of the UK 
Provision of financial 
support to the project 
operator. 
Grid access for project, 
off-taking of all electricity, 
whenever technically 
possible. 
Measuring of the 
production. 
 
In case of non-compliance, 
Belgium will lose all rights 
under the agreement and 
the area will again be at 
disposal for the 
Netherlands. 
Transfer of RES benefits to 
Belgium and the UK 
according to shares 
(depending on if option is 
called upon). 
 
 
Notification of the 
European Commission 
about joint project 
In case of non-compliance, 
either a financial 
compensation or a 
statistical transfer of 
alternative RES benefits is 
possible. 
Permitting and 
licensing (through 
‘Responsible Body’) 
Providing market 
access to the 
joint project 
 
 DESNL13116 20 
4.2 Permits and licensing 
The Dutch state is the legal owner of the territory in the EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone). Mandated 
authority is the Rijkswaterstaat, which is part of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment10. 
To build and operate an offshore wind farm in the Dutch North Sea, a permit is needed, based on the 
Public Works Act. To obtain the permit, an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) has to be 
executed. The granted permit is valid for a period of 2 years. It is not transferable without permission 
by the Ministry in advance. 
In 2009, the Government wanted to formulate a new licensing regime to optimally link the allocation 
of grants under the SDE and obtaining the required permit under the Water Act. 
In Belgium, offshore wind parks need three permits: 
 A domain concession (the right to occupy the space), granted by the federal Minister of 
Energy, after application to the Commission for Regulation of Electricity and Gas (CREG)  
 A licence (the right to operate the wind farm), granted by the Ministry of Environmental 
Affairs 
 An authorisation (the right to build and construct the wind farm), granted by the Ministry of 
Environmental Affairs 
Additionally, a number of permits have to be obtained on regional level (Flemish), with regard to 
onshore grid connection. However, since we assume a connection to the offshore hub, this is not 
directly relevant for this case. 
For the joint project, we suggest that representatives from each relevant authority from the 
Netherlands and Belgium become part of a ‘Responsible Body’ and agree on the specific permitting 
and licensing conditions for the joint project. We suggest that, in the joint project agreement, the 
Netherlands ensures that all necessary construction and operation permits are obtainable in a non-
discriminatory manner and could be issued without delay. As a special exception to Dutch national 
rules, it could be of benefit to guarantee that the joint project will not be subject to more stringent 
provisions than what would be applied under Belgium law. This seems to be not an issue in this case, 
but a detailed analysis of specific regulation has still to be undertaken (including, for example, limits 
for noise levels etc.). The same should be the case for additional permits required on Belgium 
territory, such as right of way, and the connection to the Belgian offshore hub.  
4.3 Finding the project developer 
We suggest that the project developer is selected based on a tender procedure. The ‘Responsible 
Body’ could set the tender specifications, so that Belgium and the Netherlands are both able to 
influence the specifications according to their national regulation. The winning party will then both be 
                                              
10 http://www.government.nl/ministries/ienm 
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able to obtain the necessary permits and licenses from Dutch and Belgian authorities, and will be 
granted financial support under the Belgian renewable support scheme. 
4.4 Grid Access 
The joint project will feed into the grid via an offshore hub in Belgium. This has never been done 
before in this way. Arrangements will have to be found with ELIA. 
4.5 Granting of renewable support 
In Belgium, the Federal Electricity Regulatory Authority (CREG) is responsible for the granting of 
support for offshore wind. As mentioned above, the support for offshore wind consists of a 
(minimum) fixed price certificate system 11. The minimum price is determined by law.  
In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Economic Affairs12 is responsible for the granting of support. They 
apply the SDE+ system to allocating support to renewable installation. Part of the joint project shall 
be made eligible for bidding in to the SDE+ system. The SDE+ system pays out premiums, which are 
adjusted depending on the Dutch market price. The premium to be paid out is determined by a 
competitive auctioning process. Currently, the Dutch scheme only grants support for domestic 
production that is directly connected into the Dutch grid. Respective required changes in law are 
discussed in the next section. 
In the UK, the electricity market reform has triggered a change in renewable support. As of April 
2014, a new scheme, namely the ‘Contracts for Difference’ (CfD) for Renewables has come into force. 
This is a sliding feed-in premium system, with reference market price based on the British spot 
market. The level of the guaranteed price (‘strike price’) is negotiated or allocated through a 
competitive auction process (currently under discussion). During three years, there is a transition 
period in which new installations can choose between the new CfD system and the Renewable 
Obligation system. 
4.6 Suggested amendments to national renewable energy laws 
In this case study, three Member States (Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK) want to ‘open up’ 
their national renewable energy laws and give access to generation first fed into the grid in another 
Member State. All of them want to ‘open up’ on equal terms, thus do not seek special provisions for 
the production from the joint project. Accordingly one needs to look to their national renewable 
energy laws and see how this can be done. 
                                              
11 Belgium’s support scheme might be changed into a (sliding) premium scheme with competitive pricing. However, considerations are 
ongoing, which is why we make reference to the existing scheme. 
12 http://www.government.nl/ministries/ez  
 DESNL13116 22 
4.6.1 Belgium 
Provision: Energy Law of 1999 
 
Art. 6. § 1. Met inachtneming van de bepalingen vastgesteld krachtens §,2, en onverminderd de 
bepalingen van de wet van 20 januari 1999 ter bescherming van het mariene milieu in de 
zeegebieden onder de rechtsbevoegdheid van België, kan de minister, (na advies) van de 
commissie, domeinconcessies voor een hernieuwbare duur van maximum dertig jaar verlenen 
voor de bouw en de exploitatie van installaties voor de productie van elektriciteit uit water, 
stromen of winden, in de zeegebieden waarin België rechtsmacht kan uitoefenen overeenkomstig 
het internationaal zeerecht. <W 2005-06-01/32, art. 6, 010; Inwerkingtreding : 09-11-2008> 
  § 2. Bij een in Ministerraad overlegd besluit, na advies van de commissie, bepaalt de Koning de 
voorwaarden en de procedure voor de toekenning van de concessies bedoeld in § 1, en 
inzonderheid: 
  1° de beperkingen ter vermijding dat de bouw of de exploitatie van bedoelde installaties het 
gebruik van de reguliere scheepvaartroutes, de zeevisserij of het wetenschappelijk 
zeeonderzoek in overdreven mate zou hinderen; 
  2° de maatregelen die moeten worden genomen voor de bescherming en het behoud van het 
mariene milieu, overeenkomstig de bepalingen van voornoemde wet van 20 januari 1999; 
  3° de technische voorschriften waaraan de betrokken kunstmatige eilanden, installaties en 
inrichtingen moeten beantwoorden; 
  4° de procedure voor de toekenning van bedoelde concessies, met zorg voor een gepaste 
publiciteit van het voornemen tot toekenning van een concessie alsook, in voorkomend 
geval, voor een effectieve mededinging tussen de kandidaten; 
  5° de regels inzake de overdracht en de intrekking van de concessie. 
  De maatregelen bedoeld in het eerste lid, 2°, worden vastgesteld op gezamenlijke voordracht 
van de minister en van de federale minister die bevoegd is voor de bescherming van het mariene 
milieu. 
  § 3. Artikel 4 is niet van toepassing op de installaties bedoeld in § 1. 
 
Belgian law allows the Minister to give concessions for offshore wind parks in territories over which 
Belgium may exercise jurisdiction in accordance with international law of the seas. Normally this 
would be what is considered “Belgian territory”. 
The law on financial support refers to offshore wind parks having a concession according to this very 
Art. 6.  
Thus it would be the easiest solution to add a paragraph according to which – by exception and based 
on a valid international agreement with the other respective Member State(s) – the Belgian Minister 
can give a concession to offshore wind parks in the territory over which he may do so in accordance 
with the international agreement. 
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Alternatively one may argue that the agreement between the Netherlands and Belgium would – 
though limited for a certain period of time – give Belgium (limited) jurisdiction over such respective 
territory, so that no change to Art. 6 would be required. However, given that the definition of 
jurisdiction is more comprehensive than what is covered by a lease agreement, it would be 
recommendable to make a separate provision as suggested above. 
Suggestion for a change: 
Add: 
Art. 6. §1bis “Under the same conditions as applicable to offshore wind parks in territories over 
which Belgium may exercise jurisdiction according to the international law of the seas as set out in 
this article, the Minister may grant concessions for the construction and exploitation of 
installations for the production of electricity from water, waves of wind in territories over which 
other Member States have jurisdiction, provided that there is a valid international agreement 
between Belgium and such other Member States granting Belgium such right. Such concessions 
shall in no event extent further than the rights Belgium has acquired over such territory in 
accordance with said international agreement.” 
4.6.2 The Netherlands 
Provision: Renewable Energy Act of 2007 
Art. 1  
„j. elektriciteitsnet: een net als bedoeld in artikel 1, eerste lid, onderdeel i, van de Elektriciteitswet 
1998 en een elektriciteitsnet dat is gelegen binnen de Nederlandse exclusieve economische zone 
dat is verbonden met een net als bedoeld in artikel 1, eerste lid, onderdeel i, van de 
Elektriciteitswet 1998;“ 
 
Dutch law distinguishes between support to electricity fed into the Dutch grid and electricity not fed 
into the Dutch grid. Principally, with that, it would be already possible to get support for electricity 
not fed into the grid. However, this would be under different conditions.  
Thus it would be easiest to extend the definition of “grid” into which the electricity needs to be fed 
into in order to be supported. Two options are possible: Either opening to all electricity from all 
Member States (by deleting the definition) or including a reference to an international agreement in 
the definition, to limit it to the specified projects.  
In both cases physical import would not be a requirement, as support would become available at the 
moment the electricity is fed into the grid elsewhere.  
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If physical import would have been desired, a different arrangement would need to be found. 
Suggestion for a change: 
Option 1: opening to production everywhere in the EU 
Delete the definition of electricity grid in Art. 1 j 
(if no link to the Electricity Law and thus the grid being on Dutch territory, then support principally 
open to all installations) 
Option 2: opening to production only from the joint project  
Change Art. 1: 
“j. electricity grid: a grid as referred to in Art. 1, par. 1, sub I, of the Electricity Law 1998, a grid 
within the Dutch exclusive economic zone connected with a grid as referred to in Art. 1, par. 1, 
sub I, of the Electricity Law 1998, or a grid equivalent to the former based on a valid international 
agreement between the Netherlands and the Member State in which such grid is located, provided 
that it is connected to a grid as referred to in Art. 1, par. 1, sub I, of the Electricity Law 1998, or a 
grid within the Dutch exclusive economic zone connected with a grid as referred to in Art. 1, par. 
1, sub I, of the Electricity Law 1998” 
4.6.3 The UK 
Provision: Law of 2012 (Feed in Tariffs Order) 
Art. 9 (10) 
“grid connection agreement” means an agreement in writing with a transmission licence holder or 
distribution licence holder for the making of a grid connection; and “transmission licence holder or 
distribution licence holder” means the holder of a licence under section 6(1)(b) or 6(1)(c) of the 
1989 Act(16); 
 
British law distinguishes between installations connected to the grid and installations not connected 
to the grid. For installations connected to the grid, a grid connection agreement with a British grid 
operator is required for accreditation of the installation.  
Two options exist:  
One could delete the reference to the British grid operator, in principle opening to all power plants, or 
one could use a specification by referencing an international agreement.  
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However, as the UK currently politically requires physical import, further arrangements are 
necessary, and one would have to make sure not only that there is a grid connection agreement but 
that there is a grid use (in case interconnector use) agreement which allows for the electricity to 
“arrive” in the UK. 
Suggestion for a change: 
Option 1: opening to all installations 
Art. 9 (10) 
“grid connection agreement” means an agreement in writing with a transmission licence holder or 
distribution licence holder for the making of a grid connection; in case of transmission licence holders 
or distribution licence holders other than the ones referred to under section 6(1)(b) or 6(1)(c) of the 
1989 Act(16), in addition, an agreement over the grid use has to be provided allowing for the use of 
sufficient grid and interconnector capacity for the amounts of electricity to be produced to reach the 
grid of a transmission licence holder or distribution licence holder referred to under section 6(1)(b) or 
6(1)(c) of the 1989 Act; ” 
Option 2: opening only to specific projects  
“grid connection agreement” means an agreement in writing with a transmission licence holder or 
distribution licence holder for the making of a grid connection; “transmission licence holder or 
distribution licence holder” means the holder of a licence under section 6(1)(b) or 6(1)(c) of the 1989 
Act(16), or any transmission licence holder or distribution licence holder equated with such due to a 
valid international agreement ;  in case of such trans-mission licence holders or distribution licence 
holders other than the ones referred to under section 6(1)(b) or 6(1)(c) of the 1989 Act , in addition, 
an agreement over the grid use has to be provided allowing for the use of sufficient grid and inter-
connector capacity for the amounts of electricity to be produced to reach the grid of a transmission 
licence holder or distribution licence holder referred to under section 6(1)(b) or 6(1)(c) of the 1989 
Act; ” 
4.6.4 Luxembourg 
Luxembourg does not need to open up its national support scheme. Instead of supporting the 
electricity generated in the joint project by its own feed-in system, Luxembourg will enter into a pure 
statistical transfer agreement – and will pay a certain amount of money to Belgium for the renewable 
energy credits. Little is known on how this shall work and how it shall be financed, but it appears a 
relatively easy solution to finance the statistical transfer either from the same fund as the renewable 
energy support is generally financed in Luxembourg or by establishing a separate fund. Changes to 
the renewable energy legislation strictu sensu are however not required. 
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4.7 Notification to the European Commission 
After the joint project has been agreed between Belgium and the Netherlands, the Netherlands (as 
the host country) shall notify the European Commission of their intentions. The following information 
must be submitted: 
 A description of the proposed installation 
 The proportion or amount of energy generated by the offshore wind park that shall be 
counted towards the national target of Belgium instead of that of the Netherlands 
 The time period for which the electricity generated by the joint project shall be counted 
towards the target of Belgium, in full years 
 Written consent by Belgium about the content of the notification 
When the project is in operation, the European Commission shall, within three months of the end of 
each year, be notified of the total amount of energy generated by the project as well as the amount 
of that energy which is to count towards Belgium. 
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5 Potential implementation process & timing 
5.1 Ambitious time plan: Operation until 2020 
If the joint project shall contribute to reaching the 2020 targets on renewable energy, then the 
following time plan should be considered: 
 
Figure 4: Ambitious time plan with a targeted operation of the joint project until 2020 
If the wind park shall be operational by 2020, then construction needs to start in 2017 at the latest. 
Allowing for approximately three years of construction is already a quite ambitious assumption for 
such a large wind park. Additionally, there should be at least 8-9 months reserved for the 
undertaking of the tender for the wind park. This, of course depends on the design specifications, for 
instance, if there should be one or two bidding rounds, etc. This means that by the end of 2016, all 
specifications necessary to undertake the joint project need to be in place. At least, this needs to 
comprise the joint project agreement as well as the establishment of the ‘Responsible Body’, which 
defines all tender specifications, including also the permitting and licensing situation. This leaves only 
a very limited amount of time for the negotiations around the joint project agreement. We suggest 
that this needs to be in place by mid-2015, so that the ambitious timing can be realised. 
In parallel, the project requires significant infrastructure construction. The offshore hub will need to 
be built in Belgium, best until mid-2016, before the end of the tender process – otherwise the 
associated risks might prohibit investor interest. Then, interconnection lines to the UK and the 
Netherlands need to be in place, best by mid-2019, so that the wind park project can start bidding 
into the UK and Dutch support schemes. However in our case set-up, the actual timing of the 
interconnectors is flexible, as the joint project also can start operating in a smaller setting (full 
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support by Belgium), and then the broadening of the scope can be added optionally with flexible 
timing. 
5.2 Alternative time plan: Operation before 2030 
The above described ambitious time plan may in principle make it possible to start operation of the 
joint project until 2020. However, it would require that the tendering and development of the wind 
park begins even before the necessary offshore infrastructure (i.e. offshore hub and interconnectors) 
are in place. This poses a rather large risk on the project. 
Therefore, we will here present an alternative time plan, which is developed on a bottom-up basis. In 
this case, it has to be noted that the development of the joint project is no longer mainly driven by a 
2020 target fulfilment, but rather by a long term cooperation interest of the participating countries. 
Such a bottom-up process could be based on the following principles (Figure 5): 
- After the negotiation of a joint project agreement, required changes in laws in the respective 
countries may take 10-18 months, before the ‘Responsible Body’ can be established. 
- The construction of the offshore hub and the interconnectors might take 5-10 years, 
depending on the deemed urgency of the infrastructure development (e.g. their inclusion in 
the Ten Year Network Development Plan). 
- The joint project will only be tendered when the offshore hub and at least the interconnector 
from the offshore hub to the Netherlands are certain and a commissioning date foreseeable. 
- At least one year should be reserved for the tender, if it should be undertaken in two rounds 
(a pre-qualification round and a final bidding round). This will be especially relevant if a 
competitive element is included in the support scheme (e.g. sliding premiums). 
 
 
Figure 5 Alternative time plan with a possible operation of the joint project until 2028 
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6 Conclusions 
The focus of this case study was to practically show how such cooperation could look like in order to 
be politically feasible. 
We have shown that all involved countries can potentially benefit from the joint project. Belgium 
benefits from gaining access to additional wind resources, which will help meeting the ambitious RES 
targets. The Netherlands will benefit from the connection of the wind park to the Belgian offshore 
hub. This will be at lower cost than a connection to Dutch shore – in return, the Netherlands will 
though only receive 30% of the wind production as compared to own development at the same site. 
The UK will gain an option on additional offshore wind resources at competitive prices. Luxembourg 
might have a benefit from using a concrete joint project for the import of RES benefits, as they are 
more tangible than for e.g. technology-neutral, ‘pure’ statistical transfers. 
The here described joint project and the suggested set-up are heavily influenced by their first-mover 
character and the ambitious time planning – if the project should have a chance of coming online 
before 2020, then a ‘semi-integrated’ solution for the cooperation seems most realistic. In this case, 
the Member States will cooperate regarding coordination of infrastructure development and timing, 
and also regarding statistical transfers, but not regarding the support scheme. In an alternative time 
plan, where operation could be possible in 2028, also a more integrated strategy, e.g. including a 
joint fund for the support payments, could be envisaged. 
In the described setting, we assume that each country will treat part of the joint project as being on 
their own territory and will integrate it into their own renewable support system. So, in Belgium, the 
wind park will receive certificates at a minimum price, in the Netherlands, the wind park will be able 
to bid into the SDE+ scheme and win a premium price, and in the UK, the wind park might negotiate 
a CfD contract. In order to minimise the risk for the investor and upkeep investment incentives, 
Belgium will guarantee the wind park operator that the full production can be granted support in 
Belgium. The contracts with the other two countries are thus regarded as a source of potential 
alternative income for the investor. This setting minimises the need for collaboration between 
Member States (e.g. no joint fund need to be agreed upon for support payments), and it also 
minimises the need for changes in national law.  
Once a project has shown the feasibility of joint projects for offshore wind in the North Sea, a more 
integrated strategy could however be beneficial. E.g. a joint support scheme for the area could make 
it easy to add new projects in a common scheme and the whole area could be more strategically 
developed over time. 
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APPENDIX A: Proposed Template Agreement for 
a Joint Project between Belgium, the 
Netherlands and the UK 
Agreement between 
Belgium, in the following referred to as “the off-taking Member State” 
and 
the Netherlands, in the following referred to as “the host Member State” 
and  
the United Kingdom, in the following referred to as “the secondary off-taking Member 
State” 
on 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FRAMEWORK FOR A JOINT PROJECT FOR THE GENERATION OF 
ENERGY 
FROM RENEWABLE SOURCES 
Preamble 
[…] 
Part I OBJECTIVE AND DEFINITIONS 
Article 1 Objective 
(1) The objective of this Agreement is to provide a legal framework for the implementation of a Joint 
Project under Articles 7 and 8 of Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and 
subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (hereafter: Directive 2009/28/EC) 
which provide the basis for Member States of the European Union to cooperate to realise joint 
projects relating to the production of electricity, heating or cooling from renewable energy sources. 
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The aim of the implementation of joint projects between Member States is to share the produced 
energy for the purpose of accounting towards their respective targets. 
(2) The Parties enter into this Agreement with the purpose to  
a) contribute to the cost-efficient achievement of the EU Member States’ mandatory national targets 
by allowing them to count the Joint Projects' renewable electricity production towards their national 
renewable energy target; 
b) enable the construction of additional renewable energy generation capacity based on wind power, 
to be exploited by an offshore wind park located within the Dutch exclusive economic zone; 
c) [… additional points] 
Article 2 Definitions 
Pursuant to the Agreement the following terms are defined as 
a) Joint Project: the installations generating energy from renewable sources and which are operated 
under this agreement; 
b) Directive 2009/28/EC: Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and 
subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC; 
c) National support scheme: according to Art. 2 lit. k) of the Directive 2009/28/EC any instrument, 
scheme or mechanism applied by a Member State or a group of Member States, that promotes the 
use of energy from renewable sources by reducing the cost of that energy, increasing the price at 
which it can be sold, or increasing, by means of a renewable energy obligation or otherwise, the 
volume of such energy purchased; 
d) Renewable energy target amounts: the statistical value of energy from renewable sources for the 
purpose of compliance with the mandatory national targets for the share of energy from renewable 
sources in final energy consumption as set out in the third column in part A of Annex I to the 
Directive 2009/28/EC; 
f) Joint Project operator: legal entity implementing and operating the Joint Project; 
g)… 
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Part II RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES 
Article 3 Cooperation 
The Parties shall co-operate in order to establish and maintain necessary and favourable conditions 
for the implementation of the Joint Project. 
Article 4 Obligations of the host Member State 
(1) The host Member State ensures that construction permits and all other necessary permits and 
licenses for the construction and operation of a Joint Project shall be obtainable in a non-
discriminatory manner and shall be issued without delay. In particular, the host Member State 
ensures that – as a special exception to its own national rules - for the construction and operation of 
the Joint Project no more stringent provisions will be applied than would be under the national law of 
the off-taking Member State. The conditions for the issuance of permits and licenses will be discussed 
within the Responsible Body established in accordance with Art. 6 of this Agreement and may be used 
in order to select the Joint Project in the course of the tendering procedure.  
(2) The host Member State shall ensure that the Joint Project Operator is able to comply with all 
obligations with regard to the monitoring of production and create the necessary conditions to enable 
him to provide the required proof. 
Article 5 Obligations of the off-taking Member State 
(1) The off-taking Member State guarantees the financial support of the renewable energy production 
of the Joint Project during the entire support period in accordance with and at the same level as in its 
national support scheme. 
(2) Without prejudice to Art. 5(1), in case the host Member State exercises the option to let 30% of 
the actual renewable energy production from the Joint Project participate in its national support 
scheme and use it for target compliance, as provided for below in Art. 9(2) and Art. 12(2) and in case 
such production wins a contract under the host Member State’s national support scheme, then the 
host Member State has to guarantee the financial support as in accordance with its national support 
scheme for the production for which a contract was won.  
(3) Without prejudice to Art. 5(1) and 5(2), in case the secondary off-taking Member State exercises 
the option to let 30% of the actual renewable energy production from the Joint Project participate in 
its national support scheme and use it for target compliance, as provided for below in Art. 9(3) and 
Art. 12(3) and in case such production wins a contract under the secondary off-taking Member 
State’s national support scheme, then the secondary off-taking Member State has to guarantee the 
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financial support as in accordance with its national support scheme for the production for which a 
contract was won.  
(4) The off-taking Member State commits to compensate the host Member State for the inability to 
use the land where the Joint Project is located, as well as the environmental and other direct or 
indirect negative impacts. The compensation payment is set at [xxx] per MWh. It shall be paid on an 
annual basis…  
(5) The off-taking Member State ensures that grid connection, access and use as well as all licenses 
and permits necessary to that end shall be obtainable for the Joint Project on a non-discriminatory 
basis and shall be issued without delay.  
(6) The off-taking Member State provides the host Member State with all information necessary in 
order for the host Member State to be able to meet its reporting obligations under Art. 10 of this 
Agreement. 13 
Article 6 Responsible Body 
(1) A Responsible Body consisting of at least one representative of each party to this agreement shall 
be established. Each Party shall have one vote with the Responsible Body deciding by consensus. 14 
(2) The Responsible Body shall have the following tasks: 
a) Identification of the Joint Project and definition of the details; 
b) Definition of the tendering procedure including specification of the evaluation criteria and 
determination of their weighting; 
c) Selection of the bidder;  
d) Supervision of the implementation of the Joint Project, including the permitting and licensing 
procedures, as well as the regulations regarding monitoring, tracking and issuing of proof and 
verifications; 
f) Reporting back to the Parties on a regular basis. 
 
                                              
13 According to the RES Directive, the host MS shall report – though in this setting, this is not the most logical set-up. 
14 The exact composition has to be decided. All affected authorities should be represented in the Responsible body. 
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Part III SPECIFICATIONS OF THE JOINT PROJECT 
Article 7 Specifications of Joint Projects 
(1) This Agreement covers a project with a maximum capacity of  1000 MW installed.   
(2) The Joint Project shall use wind power, which is to be generated in an offshore wind park located 
in the Borssele area, in order to be eligible under the tender procedure according to Art. 8 of this 
Agreement. 
Article 8 Selection of Joint Projects and Tender Procedure 15 
(1) The Joint Project supported in the framework of this agreement is identified according to a tender 
procedure, based on transparent, non-discriminatory criteria, set and published in advance. 
(2) The tender specifications shall be agreed upon by the Responsible Body according to the terms 
laid down in this agreement and will inter alia include: 
a) Local environmental aspects for the construction and operation of the project, both positive and 
negative;  
b) Economic and financial, as well as technical and professional capacity of the tenderers; 
c) In case the host Member State has communicated its intention to exercise its option for a 
Statistical Transfer under this Agreement, the requirement that the Joint Project for the first five 
years shall bid into the support scheme of the host Member States in accordance with the national 
legislation of the host Member State and the terms of this Agreement; 
d) […] 
(3) The contracts will be awarded to the project best meeting the criteria determined by the 
Responsible Body.  
Part IV RENEWABLE ENERGY TARGET ACCOUNTING 
 
                                              
15 In the current support framework, the tender will be about selecting the project operator. In a future competitive support mechanism, the 
tender might also involve competitive bidding on support levels, i.e. in a competitive sliding premium scheme as currently discussed in 
Belgium. 
 DESNL13116 35 
Article 9 Distribution of production for target compliance purposes 
(1) The renewable energy target amounts corresponding to the energy produced in the course of the 
Joint Project during the production period according to Article 12 of this Agreement and fed into the 
off-taking Member State's electricity grid will in its entirety be statistically transferred to the off-
taking Member State for target compliance purposes under Directive 2009/28/EC and under any 
European legislation succeeding Directive 2009/28/EC. 
(2) However, as in accordance with Art. 5(2) of this Agreement, the host Member State shall retain 
the right to have 30% of the production to be counted to its own target for target compliance 
purposes under Directive 2009/28/EC and under any European legislation succeeding Directive 
2009/28/EC. The host Member State may exercise such right provided that the Joint Project is 
successful in getting a contract for financial support in the host Member State’s national support 
scheme within the first five years of operation of the Joint Project. In such event, the host Member 
State shall notify the off-taking Member State immediately.   
(3) Without prejudice to the provisions above, in accordance with Art. 5(3) of this Agreement, the 
secondary off-taking Member State shall retain the right to have 30% of the production to be counted 
to its own target for target compliance purposes under Directive 2009/28/EC and under any 
European legislation succeeding Directive 2009/28/EC. The secondary off-taking Member State may 
exercise such right provided that the Joint Project is successful in getting a contract for financial 
support in the host Member State’s national support scheme within the first five years of operation of 
the Joint Project. In such event, the host Member State shall notify the off-taking Member State 
immediately.   
Article 10 Notification to the European Commission 
(1) After a Joint Project has been agreed upon between the host Member State and the off-taking 
Member State, the host Member States shall notify the European Commission of their intentions and 
shall submit the following documents according to Art. 7 (3) of the Directive 2009/28/EC: 
a) A description of the proposed installation; 
b) The identification of the Member State in whose favour the notification is being made and written 
consent with the content of the notification by the off-taking Member State; 
c) The proportion or amount of energy generated by the plant that shall be counted towards the 
national target of each respective EU Member State; 
d) The time period for which the electricity generated by the joint project shall be counted towards 
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the Member States’ respective targets in full years. 
(2) Once the plant is in operation, the host Member State shall, within three months of the end of 
each year falling into the period notified according Art. 11 (1)d), notify to the European Commission 
and the off-taking Member State the total amount of energy generated in the joint project as well as 
the amount of that energy which is to count towards the off-taking Member State's national target. 16 
(3) Members of the Responsible Body shall receive a copy of this notification. 
Part V FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS 
Article 12 Financial Commitments 
(1) The financial support for the Joint Project will be provided in the form of operational support by 
the off-taking Member State. The operational support will be paid through the existing instruments 
and according to the rules of the national support scheme of the off-taking Member State. The off-
taking Member State will make the necessary adaptions to its national support scheme to allow for 
such financing of the Joint Project.  
(2) However, in accordance with Art. 5(2) and Art. 9(2) of this Agreement, the host Member State 
will provide financial support for the Joint Project in accordance with its national support scheme 
when exercising its right to use 30% of the production for target compliance under the Directive 
2009/28/EC and such production has won a contract under the national support scheme. In such 
case, and in order to allow the participation of the Joint Project in its national support scheme, the 
host Member State will make the necessary adaptions to its national support scheme to allow for 
such financing.  
(3) Further, and in accordance with Art. 5(3) and Art. 9(3) of this Agreement, the secondary off-
taking Member State will provide financial support for the Joint Project in accordance with its national 
support scheme when exercising its right to use 30% of the production for target compliance under 
the Directive 2009/28/EC and such production has won a contract under the national support 
scheme. In such case, and in order to allow the participation of the Joint Project in its national 
support scheme, the secondary off-taking Member State will make the necessary adaptions to its 
national support scheme to allow for such financing.  
                                              
16 In this joint project, the off-taking Member State has access to the measuring data. However, Art. 7 and 8 of the Directive refer to the 
host Member State for being responsible for reporting to the European Commission.  
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(4) After expiry of the support period determined by the off-taking Member State’s national support 
scheme, the production from the Joint Project which received support from the off-taking Member 
State’s support scheme shall no longer be eligible for support from the host Member State in the 
course of its national support scheme and vice versa.  
(5) The Member State granting the support is responsible for notifying the European Commission for 
state-aid compatibility, if applicable. 
Article 15 Network integration 
(1) The costs for potential grid reinforcements necessitated by the Joint Project will not be borne by 
the project operator but by Member State in which they occur. These costs will be determined at the 
sole responsibility of the respective Member State. 
(2) The costs of grid connection to the offshore hub are borne directly by the project operator. 
(3) The costs of necessary grid reinforcements are borne by the responsible transmission system 
operator. 
Article 16 Payment Procedure 
The payments of operational support shall be made directly to the Joint Project Operator after the 
submission of the required proof as laid down in Art. 20 of this Agreement. 
Part VI EXECUTION OF THE OPTION FOR STATISTICAL TRANSFER 
Article 17 Execution of the option  
(1) If the host Member State and/or the secondary off-taking Member State intend to exercise the 
option for a Statistical Transfer granted under this Agreement, the off-taking Member State shall be 
notified immediately. The host Member State and/or the secondary off-taking Member State deciding 
to exercise the option take the necessary measures to allow the participation of the Joint Project in its 
national support scheme.  
(2) Contracts in the host Member State and the secondary off-taking Member State are awarded 
periodically. The host Member State and/or the secondary off-taking Member State shall allow the 
production from the Joint Project participation in the award procedure on equal terms as electricity 
produced within their own territory.  
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(3) The concrete amount of electricity to be statistically transferred as in accordance with this 
agreement depends on the actual production of the Joint Project. For the production to be 
transferred, such transfers shall be made annually.  
(4) When the production from the Joint Project has won a contract, the host Member State and/or the 
secondary off-taking Member State  immediately notify the off-taking Member State. The off-taking 
Member State thereupon undertakes to notify the statistical transfer of the respective 30% of the 
production of the Joint Project to the European Commission within the deadline set out in Article 6 
paragraph 2 of Directive 2009/28/EC. 
(5) In such event, the host Member State and/or the secondary off-taking Member State guarantee 
for the operational support for the 30% of the production from the Joint Project in accordance with 
the terms of its own national support scheme. Those 30% of the production shall not be eligible for 
support in the off-taking Member State anymore, neither during the duration of the support by the 
host Member State, nor after the end of such support. The host Member State and/or the secondary 
off-taking Member State pay the operational support owed in accordance with the terms of its own 
national support scheme directly to the Joint Project Operator. There is no obligation of the host 
and/or the secondary off-taking Member State Member State to make any payments to the off-taking 
Member State.  
(6) The off-taking Member State allows for the physical transfer of the production which has won a 
contract under the national support scheme of the host  Member State and/or the secondary off-
taking Member State to the host Member State and/or the secondary off-taking Member State over 
the interconnector:   In this context, the following obligations apply:  
a) the off-taking Member State shall guarantee and provide for the grid enforcement for all grids 
within its national territory as in accordance with its national legislation;  
b) the off-taking Member State shall guarantee and provide for all the enforcements necessary with 
regard to the interconnection capacity needed for the transfer to the buying Member State; 
c) the host Member State and the secondary off-taking Member State  shall guarantee and provide 
for the grid enforcement for all grids within their national territory; 
d) the costs which are, according to the legislation of the respective Member State, to be passed on 
to the user of the grid shall be borne by the Joint Project Operator and shall be considered within the 
price for which the production from the Joint Project is offered in the procedure for awarding support 
in the national support scheme of the host Member State.   
Physical transfers shall be made in real time, as in accordance with the production from the Joint 
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Project.  
Article 18 Notification to the European Commission  
(1) Statistical transfers as agreed between the Parties, shall be notified jointly by the Member States 
involved in the specific transaction to the European Commission according to Art. 6 paragraph 2 of 
the Directive 2009/28/EC, specifying the exact amount of energy from renewable sources to be 
statistically transferred from the off-taking Member State to the host Member State and/or the 
secondary off-taking Member State for each relevant calendar year measured in ktoe, as well as the 
corresponding price paid by the host Member State and/or the secondary off-taking Member State. 
As there is no compensation for the off-taking Member State, the notification shall state that a price 
of 0 Euro was paid.  
(2) To enable the off-taking Member State to transfer energy from renewable sources statistically to 
the secondary off-taking Member State, the notification of the statistical transfer between the host 
Member State and the off-taking Member State shall be executed by notification first.  
(3) A copy of the respective notification shall be sent to the partaking Member States’  contact point 
at least a month in advance of the deadline provided for in Article 6 paragraph 2 of Directive 
2009/28/EC. Through the joint notification in accordance with Art. 18(1) of this agreement, the 
Member States involved are deemed to have notified their agreement with the statistical transfer 
within the deadline of Article 6 paragraph 2 of Directive 2009/28/EC. 
(4) To facilitate the European Commission's task of monitoring the overall progress of implementation 
of and compliance with Directive 2009/28/EC the Parties will also notify the Commission of the overall 
content of this Agreement in particular including the amounts to be transferred during the entire time 
period of the Agreement, possible options for additional transfers and price adaptation arrangements 
within a month after the coming into force of this Agreement. 
PART V RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE JOINT PROJECT PARTIES (RISK SHARING) 
Article 19 General Commitment 
(1) In case of non-compliance with any obligation under this Agreement a party is obliged to 
compensate the injured party fully for any damages incurred. 
(2) The payment of such damages shall not limit the right to seek further compensation under the 
Agreement or otherwise. 
(3) Sanctions towards the project operator will be laid down and further specified in  the tender 
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specifications in case he fails to construct the Joint Project by the date determined in the tender 
specifications or in case yearly production of the Joint Project falls beneath [xx MWh]. 
Article 20 Responsibilities of the host Member State 
(1) The host Member State guarantees the transfer to the off-taking Member State for target 
compliance purposes under the Directive of the entire actual yearly production of the Joint Project, 
notwithstanding the provisions in Art. 5(2), Art. 9(2), Art. and 12(2) of this Agreement.  
(2) The host Member State guarantees the transfer to the secondary off-taking Member State for 
target compliance purposes under the Directive of the 30% of the entire actual yearly production of 
the Joint project for which the option according to this Agreement has been exercised.  
(3) When exercising its right to use 30% of the entire actual yearly production for its target 
compliance in accordance with Art. 5(3), Art. 9(2) and Art. 12(2), the host Member State guarantees 
the transfer to the off-taking Member State of 70% of the entire actual yearly production of the Joint 
Project, or, as the case may be should the secondary off-taking Member State have exercised its 
option, 40% to the off-taking Member State and 30% to the secondary off-taking Member State.  
OPTION 1 (financial compensation) 17 
(3) In case and to the extent that a breach of the host Member State's obligations under this 
Agreement causes the off-taking Member State and/or the secondary off-taking Member State to fail 
to reach its target under Directive 2009/28/EC, the host Member State is under an obligation pay to 
the off-taking Member State and/or the secondary off-taking Member State a penalty amounting to 
[the price for a statistical transfer to make up for it/the penalty imposed for an infringement of 
European law by the European Court of Justice/fixed amount per MWh]. 
OPTION 2  (replacement obligation) 
(3) In case of failure of the host Member State to transfer the production of the Joint Project to off-
taking Member State and/or the secondary off-taking Member State, the host Member State is under 
an obligation to compensate this shortfall by purchasing statistical transfers according to Article 6 of 
Directive 2009/28/EC from other Member States which have a surplus available. Such obligation shall 
not apply to the extent the host Member State has exercised the option to retain 30% of the 
production for its own target compliance and has complied with the provisions for doing so set out in 
                                              
17 To be decided. However, NL should not stand in for failure of the Joint Project to deliver the production expected - such risks should be for 
BE. 
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this Agreement and any other relevant Agreement.  
Article 21 Responsibilities of the off-taking Member State and the secondary off-taking Member State  
(1) In accordance with Art, 5 and Art. 12 of this Agreement the off-taking Member State as well as 
the secondary off-taking Member State, in case the latter exercises its option, will be responsible for 
the provision of the financial support over the agreed time period. 
(2) In case they fail to comply with tis obligations leading to a shortfall in support payments to the 
project operator, they lose all rights under this Agreement. 18 
Part VII MONITORING, PROOF AND VERIFICATION 
Article 22 Eligibility Criteria and required proof 
(1) In accordance with Art. 7 (2) of Directive 2009/28/EC the Joint Project needs to comply with the 
following requirements in order to receive the support payments: 
a) The energy is produced exclusively from renewable energy sources; 
b) The energy is produced by a newly constructed installation that became operational after 25 June 
2009 or by the increased capacity of an installation that was refurbished after that date. 
(2) In accordance with Article 16 of this Agreement, the Joint Project Operator shall be granted 
production support after presenting proof of electricity production from renewable energy sources, 
stating the amount, time period and renewable origin of the electricity produced by the Joint Project. 
Article 23 Verification 
Power meter and energy production shall be verified annually by an independent verifier. The 
verification needs to confirm that: 
a) The electricity comes from an eligible renewable energy plant; 
b) The electricity is produced from renewable sources; 
c) The meter operates correctly and is properly accounted for. 
                                              
18 No penalty payment to the host MS necessary, as normally there should be no obligation to support the plant under Dutch law, if no 
contract under SDE+ is won (or cannot be won as NL has not opened its support scheme and does not want to participate). 
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Part VIII GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 24 Relationship between this Agreement and other International Obligations 
Nothing in this Agreement shall derogate from the rights or obligations of any State under any 
relevant international treaty or rule of international law. 
Article 25 Force Majeure 
(1) Responsibility for non-performance or delay in performance on the part of any Party to this 
Agreement with respect to any obligations or any part thereof under this Agreement, other than an 
obligation to contribute financially, shall be suspended to the extent that such non-performance or 
delay in performance is caused or occasioned by Force Majeure, as defined in this Agreement. 
(2) Force Majeure shall be limited to: 
a) Natural disasters (earthquakes, landslides, cyclones, floods, fires, lightning, tidal waves, volcanic 
eruptions and other similar natural events or occurrences); 
b) War between sovereign States where the relevant State has not initiated the war under the 
principles of international law, acts of terrorism, sabotage, rebellion or insurrection; 
c) International embargoes against States other than the relevant State, provided, in every case, that 
the specified event or cause of the above mentioned types and any resulting effects preventing the 
performance by the relevant State of its obligations, or any part thereof, are beyond the relevant 
State’s control. 
(3) If a Party to this Agreement is prevented from carrying out its obligations or any part thereof 
under this Agreement (other than an obligation to pay money) as a result of Force Majeure, it shall 
notify in writing the other affected Parties to which performance is owed. The notice must: 
a) Specify the obligations or part thereof that cannot be performed; 
b) Fully describe the event of Force Majeure; 
c) Estimate the time during which the Force Majeure will continue; and 
d) Specify the measures proposed to be adopted to remedy or abate the Force Majeure. 
Following this notice, and for so long as the Force Majeure continues, any obligations or parts thereof 
which cannot be performed because of the Force Majeure, other than the obligation to pay money, 
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shall be suspended. 
Article 26 Dispute Settlement 
(1) Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating exclusively to this Agreement, or the 
breach, termination or invalidity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
(2) The following conditions will apply: 
a) The appointing authority shall be … [name of institution or person]; 
b) The number of arbitrators shall be ... [one or three]; 
c) The place of arbitration shall be ... [town and country]; 
d) The language to be used in the arbitral proceedings shall be [...]. 
Article 27 Confidentiality 
(1) The Parties to this Agreement are committed to confidentiality against third parties for all 
information and objects that are not to be notified to the European Commission according to Art. 11 
of this Agreement or have not been otherwise published and are conveyed in confidence by any other 
Party. The receiving Party shall not use any such information or objects for any purpose other than in 
accordance with the terms of this Agreement. The disclosure of confidential information or objects 
requires the express written consent by the conveying Party. 
(2) The confidentiality clause excludes objects or types of information that 
a) have been developed or are being developed by the receiving Party independently of the 
information; 
b) are part of the generally accessible state of technology or that reach this status without the fault 
of the receiving Party or 
c) were already in the possession of the receiving Party at the time of the announcement. 
Article 28 Written Form 
All additions and modifications to this Agreement, which will be numbered consecutively, shall be duly 
signed by both parties prior to affecting any of the changes therein contained. No addition or 
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modification of this Agreement shall be effective or binding on either of the parties hereto unless 
agreed in writing and duly signed by the parties. 
Article 29 Severability Clause 
If any part of this Agreement shall be or become invalid, then it shall be replaced by that valid 
regulation which comes closest to its meaning and intention. All other parts of this disclaimer shall 
remain valid in that case. 
Article 30 Entry into Force 
This Agreement shall enter into force on […date…]. 
Article 31 Termination/Modification/Review 
(1) The agreement will terminate on […date…]. 
(2) By way of exception, this Agreement can be terminated […] 
(3) The agreement can be amended at any time by mutual consent of the parties documented in 
writing. Any such amendment shall be deposited in accordance with this Agreement and enter into 
force one month after the date of the deposit. The parties will review this agreement at least once 
every three years to determine whether it should be revised, renewed [or cancelled]. 
Article 32 Depositary 
(1) [Member State X] shall act as the Depositary of the Agreement. 
(2) The original of the Agreement, in the […] languages, each version being equally authentic, shall 
be deposited with the Depositary. The Depositary shall transmit certified copies of each of these 
versions to the Parties which have signed the Agreement. 
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APPENDIX B: Proposed Template Agreement for 
a statistical transfer between Belgium and 
Luxemburg 
Agreement between 
Belgium, in the following referred to as “the selling Member State” 
and 
Luxemburg, in the following referred to as “the buying Member State” 
on 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FRAMEWORK FOR 
THE STATISTICAL TRANSFER OF ENERGY FROM RENEWABLE SOURCES 
FOR TARGET COMPLIANCE PURPOSES UNDER DIRECTIVE 2009/28/EC GENERATED IN THE 
JOINT PROJECT OFFSHORE WINDPARK  
Preamble 
[…] 
Part 1OBJECTIVE AND DEFINITIONS 
Article 1 Objective 
(1) The objective of this Agreement is to provide a legal framework for the implementation of 
statistical transfers under Articles 6 of Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and 
amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (hereafter: Directive 
2009/28/EC). 
(2) The Parties enter into this Agreement with the purpose of  
a) contributing to the cost-efficient achievement of the EU target to increase the share of energy 
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from renewable sources to 20 percent by 2020; 
b) optimise the balance of benefits from statistical transfers of renewable energy target amounts for 
both the buying and the selling Member State; 
c) create broad public acceptance with regard to statistical transfers 
d) [… additional points] 
Article 2 Definitions 
Pursuant to the Agreement the following terms are defined as 
a) Selling Member State: a Member State of the European Union which, as a party to this Agreement, 
intends to transfer the renewable energy target amounts to the buying Member State according to 
this agreement; 
b) Buying Member State: a Member State of the European Union which, as a party to this Agreement, 
intends to receive the renewable energy amounts for target compliance purposes under Directive 
2009/28/EC from the selling Member State; 
c) Directive 2009/28/EC: Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and 
subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC; 
d) Renewable energy target amount: the statistical value of energy from renewable sources as 
reported for the purpose of compliance with the mandatory national targets for the share of energy 
from renewable sources in final energy consumption as set out in the third column in part A of Annex 
I to the Directive 2009/28/EC; 
e) Joint Project: the project identified, constructed and exploited in accordance with the Joint Project 
Agreement;  
f) Joint Project Agreement: the Agreement of …  [here to be referred to the Agreement above – 
possibly also in Annex.] 
g) Joint Project Operator: the developer and operator of the Joint Project identified, constructed and 
exploited in accordance with the Joint Project Agreement;  
h) National support scheme: according to Art. 2 lit. k) of the Directive 2009/28/EC any instrument, 
scheme or mechanism applied by a Member State or a group of Member States, that promotes the 
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use of energy from renewable sources by reducing the cost of that energy, increasing the price at 
which it can be sold, or increasing, by means of a renewable energy obligation or otherwise, the 
volume of such energy purchased;  
g) … 
Part 2KEY OBLIGATIONS 
Article 3 Cooperation 
(1) The Parties shall at all times co-operate in order to establish and maintain the necessary and 
favourable conditions for the implementation of the statistical transfer. 
(2) National contact points are established to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement and 
deal with any matters arising in the course of the implementation. The contact point of the selling 
Member States will be [xx]. The contact point of the buying Member State will be [yy]. 
Article 4 Obligations of the Parties 
(1) The buying Member State guarantees the selling Member to buy 10% of the production from the 
Joint Project for the price agreed and set out in Art. 5 of this Agreement.  19 
(2)  The selling Member State undertakes to notify the statistical transfer of the respective 10% of 
the production of the Joint Project to the European Commission within the deadline set out in Article 
6 paragraph 2 of Directive 2009/28/EC. 
Part 3 SPECIFICATIONS AND NOTIFICATION OF STATISTICAL TRANSFERS 
Article 5 Specifications of Statistical Transfers 
(1) This Agreement covers the statistical transfer of 10% of the production of the Joint Project.   
(2) The concrete amount of electricity to be statistically transferred as in accordance with this 
agreement depends on the actual production of the Joint Project.  
 
                                              
19 Alternatively, this could also be formulated as a call option instead of a purchase guarantee. 
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Article 6 Notification to the European Commission 
(1) Statistical transfers as agreed between the Parties, shall be notified by the selling Member State 
to the European Commission according to Art. 6 paragraph 2 of the Directive 2009/28/EC, specifying 
the exact amount of energy from renewable sources to be statistically transferred from the selling 
Member State to the buying Member State for each relevant calendar year measured in ktoe, as well 
as the corresponding price paid by the buying Member State.  
(2) A copy of this notification shall be sent to the buying Member State's contact point at least a 
month in advance of the deadline provided for in Article 6 paragraph 2 of Directive 2009/28/EC. The 
buying Member State shall notify the Commission of its agreement with the statistical transfer within 
the deadline of Article 6 paragraph 2 of Directive 2009/28/EC.6 
(3) To facilitate the European Commission's task of monitoring the overall progress of implementation 
of and compliance with Directive 2009/28/EC the Parties will also notify the Commission of the overall 
content of the agreement in particular including the amounts to be transferred during the entire time 
period of the Agreement, possible options for additional transfers and price adaptation arrangements 
within a month after the coming into force of this agreement. 
Part 4PAYMENTS AND OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES 
Article 7 Payments  
(1) The price per renewable target amount transferred shall be [xx] Euro per ktoe in the years 2018 
to 2020. In the years thereafter the price shall be adjusted according the development of the average 
costs for supporting the generation of energy from renewable energy in the selling country according 
to the following formula: [definition of adjustment formula] 
(2) The buying Member State shall disburse the due amount onto [the account xx] at the latest by 30 
April of the year following the year for which a notification according to Art. 6(1) of this Agreement 
has been made by the selling Member State. 
Article 8 Responsibilities in case of non-compliance 
(1) The Member States as project parties assume the responsibility for any failure or refusal to 
perform their obligations under this Agreement other than for reasons of force majeure according to 
Art. 9 of this Agreement. 
(2) In case of non-compliance with any obligation under this Agreement a party is obliged to 
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compensate the injured party fully for any damages incurred due to the non-compliance. 
(3) The payment of such damages shall not limit the right to seek further compensation under the 
Agreement or otherwise. 
Part 5 GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 8 Relationship between this Agreement and other International Obligations 
Nothing in this Agreement shall derogate from the rights or obligations of any State under any 
relevant international treaty or rule of international law. 
Article 9 Force Majeure 
(1) Responsibility for non-performance or delay in performance on the part of any Party to this 
Agreement with respect to any obligations or any part thereof under this Agreement, other than an 
obligation to contribute financially, shall be suspended to the extent that such non-performance or 
delay in performance is caused or occasioned by Force Majeure, as defined in this Agreement. 
(2) Force Majeure shall be limited to: 
a) Natural disasters (earthquakes, landslides, cyclones, floods, fires, lightning, tidal waves, volcanic 
eruptions and other similar natural events or occurrences); 
b) War between sovereign States where the relevant State has not initiated the war under the 
principles of international law, acts of terrorism, sabotage, rebellion or insurrection; 
c) International embargoes against States other than the relevant State, provided, in every case, that 
the specified event or cause of the above mentioned types and any resulting effects preventing the 
performance by the relevant State of its obligations, or any part thereof, are beyond the relevant 
State’s control. 
(3) If a Party to this Agreement is prevented from carrying out its obligations or any part thereof 
under this Agreement (other than an obligation to pay money) as a result of Force Majeure, it shall 
notify in writing the other affected Parties to which performance is owed. The notice must: 
a) Specify the obligations or part thereof that cannot be performed; 
b) Fully describe the event of Force Majeure; 
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c) Estimate the time during which the Force Majeure will continue; and 
d) Specify the measures proposed to be adopted to remedy or abate the Force Majeure. 
Following this notice, and for so long as the Force Majeure continues, any obligations or parts thereof 
which cannot be performed because of the Force Majeure, other than the obligation to pay money, 
shall be suspended. 
Article 10 Dispute Settlement 
(1) Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating exclusively to this Agreement, or the 
breach, termination or invalidity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
(2) The following conditions will apply: 
a) The appointing authority shall be … [name of institution or person]; 
b) The number of arbitrators shall be ... [one or three]; 
c) The place of arbitration shall be ... [town and country]; 
d) The language to be used in the arbitral proceedings shall be [...]. 
Article 11 Confidentiality 
(1) The Parties to this Agreement are committed to confidentiality against third parties for all 
information and objects that are not to be notified to the European Commission according to Art. 6 of 
the Agreement or have not been otherwise published and are conveyed in confidence by any other 
Party. The receiving Party shall not use any such information or objects for any purpose other than in 
accordance with the terms of this Agreement. The disclosure of confidential information or objects 
requires the express written consent by the conveying Party. 
(2) The confidentiality clause excludes objects or types of information that 
a) have been developed or are being developed by the receiving Party independently of the 
information; 
b) are part of the generally accessible state of technology or that reach this status without the fault 
of the receiving Party or 
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c) were already in the possession of the receiving Party at the time of the announcement. 
Article 12 Written Form 
All additions and modifications to this Agreement, which will be numbered consecutively, shall be duly 
signed by both parties prior to affecting any of the changes therein contained. No addition or 
modification of this Agreement shall be effective or binding on either of the parties hereto unless 
agreed in writing and duly signed by the parties. 
Article 13 Severability Clause 
If any part of this Agreement shall be or become invalid, then it shall be replaced by that valid 
regulation which comes closest to its meaning and intention. All other parts of this disclaimer shall 
remain valid in that case. 
Article 14 Entry into Force 
This Agreement shall enter into force on […date…]. 
Article 15 Termination/Modification/Review 
(1) The agreement will terminate on […date…]. 
(2) By way of exception, this Agreement can be terminated […] 
(3) The agreement can be amended at any time by mutual consent of the parties documented in 
writing. Any such amendment shall be deposited according to Art. 16 of this Agreement and enter 
into force one month after the date of the deposit. The parties will review this agreement at least 
once every three years to determine whether it should be revised, renewed [or canceled]. 
Article 16 Depositary 
(1) [Member State X] shall act as the Depositary of the Agreement. 
(2) The original of the Agreement, in the […] languages, each version being equally authentic, shall 
be deposited with the Depositary. The Depositary shall transmit certified copies of each of these 
versions to the Parties which have signed the Agreement. 
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APPENDIX C: Alternative Template Agreement 
for a statistical transfer between Belgium and 
the UK (if not included in the Joint Project 
Agreement) 
Agreement between 
Belgium, in the following referred to as “the selling Member State” 
and 
The United Kingdom, in the following referred to as “the buying Member State” 
on 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FRAMEWORK FOR 
THE STATISTICAL TRANSFER OF ENERGY FROM RENEWABLE SOURCES 
FOR TARGET COMPLIANCE PURPOSES UNDER DIRECTIVE 2009/28/EC GENERATED IN THE 
JOINT PROJECT OFFSHORE WINDPARK 
AS WELL AS THE PHYSICAL TRANSFER OF THE RESPECTIVE ENERGY 
Preamble 
[…] 
Part 1OBJECTIVE AND DEFINITIONS 
Article 1 Objective 
(1) The objective of this Agreement is to provide a legal framework for the implementation of 
statistical transfers under Articles 6 of Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and 
amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (hereafter: Directive 
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2009/28/EC). 
(2) The Parties enter into this Agreement with the purpose of  
a) contributing to the cost-efficient achievement of the EU target to increase the share of energy 
from renewable sources to 20 percent by 2020; 
b) optimise the balance of benefits from statistical transfers of renewable energy tar-get amounts for 
both the buying and the selling Member State; 
c) create broad public acceptance with regard to statistical transfers 
d) [… additional points] 
Article 2 Definitions 
Pursuant to the Agreement the following terms are defined as 
a) Selling Member State: a Member State of the European Union which, as a party to this Agreement, 
intends to transfer the renewable energy target amounts to the buying Member State according to 
this agreement; 
b) Buying Member State: a Member State of the European Union which, as a party to this Agreement, 
intends to receive the renewable energy amounts for target compliance purposes under Directive 
2009/28/EC from the selling Member State; 
c) Directive 2009/28/EC: Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and 
subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC; 
d) Renewable energy target amount: the statistical value of energy from renewable sources as 
reported for the purpose of compliance with the mandatory national tar-gets for the share of energy 
from renewable sources in final energy consumption as set out in the third column in part A of Annex 
I to the Directive 2009/28/EC; 
e) Joint Project: the project identified, constructed and exploited in accordance with the Joint Project 
Agreement;  
f) Joint Project Agreement: the Agreement of …  [here to be referred to the Agreement above – 
possibly also in Annex.] 
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g) Joint Project Operator: the developer and operator of the Joint Project identified, constructed and 
exploited in accordance with the Joint Project Agreement;  
h) National support scheme: according to Art. 2 lit. k) of the Directive 2009/28/EC any instrument, 
scheme or mechanism applied by a Member State or a group of Member States, that promotes the 
use of energy from renewable sources by reducing the cost of that energy, increasing the price at 
which it can be sold, or increasing, by means of a renewable energy obligation or otherwise, the 
volume of such energy purchased; 
g) … 
Part 2KEY OBLIGATIONS 
Article 3 Cooperation 
(1) The Parties shall at all times co-operate in order to establish and maintain the necessary and 
favourable conditions for the implementation of the statistical transfer. 
(2) National contact points are established to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement and 
deal with any matters arising in the course of the implementation. The contact point of the selling 
Member States will be [xx]. The contact point of the buying Member State will be [yy]. 
Article 4 Obligations of the Parties 
(1) The selling Member State grants the right to use 30% of the production from the Joint Project for 
the achievement of its target under the Directive 2009/28/EC.  
(2) If the buying Member State intends to exercise this option, the selling Member State shall be 
notified immediately. The buying Member State takes the necessary measures to allow the 
participation of the Joint Project in its national support scheme.  
(3) When the production from the Joint Project has won a contract, the buying Member State 
immediately notifies the selling Member State. The selling Member State thereupon undertakes to 
notify the statistical transfer of the respective 30% of the production of the Joint Project to the 
European Commission within the deadline set out in Article 6 paragraph 2 of Directive 2009/28/EC. 
(4) The buying Member State guarantees for the operational support for the 30% of the production 
from the Joint Project in accordance with the terms of its own national support scheme. Those 30% 
of the production shall not be eligible for support in the selling Member State anymore, neither during 
the duration of the support by the buying Member State, nor after the end of such support. The 
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buying Member State pays the operational support owed in accordance with the terms of its own 
national support scheme directly to the Joint Project Operator. There is no obligation of the buying 
Member State to make any payments to the selling Member State.  
(5) The selling Member State allows for the physical transfer of the production which has won a 
contract under the national support scheme of the buying Member State to the buying Member State 
over the existing interconnector between the selling Member State and the buying Member State. In 
this context, the following obligations apply:  
a) the selling Member State shall guarantee and provide for the grid enforcement for all grids within 
its national territory as in accordance with its national legislation;  
b) the selling Member State shall guarantee and provide for all the enforcements necessary with 
regard to the interconnection capacity needed for the transfer to the buying Member State; 
c) the buying Member State shall guarantee and provide for the grid enforcement for all grids within 
its national territory; 
d) the costs which are, according to the legislation of the respective Member State, to be passed on 
to the user of the grid shall be borne by the Joint Project Operator and shall be considered within the 
price for which the production from the Joint Project is offered in the procedure for awarding a 
contract for financial support in the national support scheme of the buying Member State.   
Physical transfers shall be made in real time, as in accordance with the production from the Joint 
Project.  
Part 3 SPECIFICATIONS AND NOTIFICATION OF STATISTICAL TRANSFERS 
Article 5 Specifications of Statistical Transfers 
(1) This Agreement covers the statistical transfer of 30% of the production of the Joint Project if the 
buying Member State has notified the selling Member State of the exercise of the option in 
accordance with Art. 4 of this agreement, and under the condition that such production is able to win 
a contract under the national support scheme of the buying Member State. It only applies if and to 
the extent the electricity produced in the Joint Project wins such a contract. However, in such case it 
applies automatically, with the buying Member State being obliged to pay for and the selling Member 
State being obliged to transfer the respective production.  
(2) Contracts in the buying Member State are awarded periodically. The buying Member State shall 
allow the production from the Joint Project participation in the award procedure on equal terms as 
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electricity produced in the buying Member State.  
(3) The concrete amount of electricity to be statistically transferred as in accordance with this 
agreement depends on the actual production of the Joint Project. For the production to be 
transferred, such transfers shall be made annually.  
Article 6 Notification to the European Commission 
(1) Statistical transfers as agreed between the Parties, shall be notified by the selling Member State 
to the European Commission according to Art. 6 paragraph 2 of the Directive 2009/28/EC, specifying 
the exact amount of energy from renewable sources to be statistically transferred from the selling 
Member State to the buying Member State for each relevant calendar year measured in ktoe, as well 
as the corresponding price paid by the buying Member State. As in accordance with Art. 4(3) of this 
Agreement, there is no compensation for the selling Member State, the notification shall state that a 
price of 0 Euro was paid.  
(2) A copy of this notification shall be sent to the buying Member State's contact point at least a 
month in advance of the deadline provided for in Article 6 paragraph 2 of Directive 2009/28/EC. The 
buying Member State shall notify the Commission of its agreement with the statistical transfer within 
the deadline of Article 6 paragraph 2 of Directive 2009/28/EC.6 
(3) To facilitate the European Commission's task of monitoring the overall progress of implementation 
of and compliance with Directive 2009/28/EC the Parties will also notify the Commission of the overall 
content of the agreement in particular including the amounts to be transferred during the entire time 
period of the Agreement, possible options for additional transfers and price adaptation arrangements 
within a month after the coming into force of this agreement. 
Part 4 OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES 
Article 7 Responsibilities in case of non-compliance 
(1) The Member States as project parties assume the responsibility for any failure or refusal to 
perform their obligations under this Agreement other than for reasons of force majeure according to 
Art. 9 of this Agreement. 
(2) In case of non-compliance with any obligation under this Agreement a party is obliged to 
compensate the injured party fully for any damages incurred due to the non-compliance. 
(3) The payment of such damages shall not limit the right to seek further compensation under the 
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Agreement or otherwise. 
Part 5 GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 8 Relationship between this Agreement and other International Obligations 
Nothing in this Agreement shall derogate from the rights or obligations of any State under any 
relevant international treaty or rule of international law. 
Article 9 Force Majeure 
(1) Responsibility for non-performance or delay in performance on the part of any Party to this 
Agreement with respect to any obligations or any part thereof under this Agreement, other than an 
obligation to contribute financially, shall be suspended to the extent that such non-performance or 
delay in performance is caused or occasioned by Force Majeure, as defined in this Agreement. 
(2) Force Majeure shall be limited to: 
a) Natural disasters (earthquakes, landslides, cyclones, floods, fires, lightning, tidal waves, volcanic 
eruptions and other similar natural events or occurrences); 
b) War between sovereign States where the relevant State has not initiated the war under the 
principles of international law, acts of terrorism, sabotage, rebellion or insurrection; 
c) International embargoes against States other than the relevant State, provided, in every case, that 
the specified event or cause of the above mentioned types and any resulting effects preventing the 
performance by the relevant State of its obligations, or any part thereof, are beyond the relevant 
State’s control. 
(3) If a Party to this Agreement is prevented from carrying out its obligations or any part thereof 
under this Agreement (other than an obligation to pay money) as a result of Force Majeure, it shall 
notify in writing the other affected Parties to which performance is owed. The notice must: 
a) Specify the obligations or part thereof that cannot be performed; 
b) Fully describe the event of Force Majeure; 
c) Estimate the time during which the Force Majeure will continue; and 
d) Specify the measures proposed to be adopted to remedy or abate the Force Majeure. 
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Following this notice, and for so long as the Force Majeure continues, any obligations or parts thereof 
which cannot be performed because of the Force Majeure, other than the obligation to pay money, 
shall be suspended. 
Article 10 Dispute Settlement 
(1) Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating exclusively to this Agreement, or the 
breach, termination or invalidity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
(2) The following conditions will apply: 
a) The appointing authority shall be … [name of institution or person]; 
b) The number of arbitrators shall be ... [one or three]; 
c) The place of arbitration shall be ... [town and country]; 
d) The language to be used in the arbitral proceedings shall be [...]. 
Article 11 Confidentiality 
(1) The Parties to this Agreement are committed to confidentiality against third par-ties for all 
information and objects that are not to be notified to the European Com-mission according to Art. 6 
of the Agreement or have not been otherwise published and are conveyed in confidence by any other 
Party. The receiving Party shall not use any such information or objects for any purpose other than in 
accordance with the terms of this Agreement. The disclosure of confidential information or objects re-
quires the express written consent by the conveying Party. 
(2) The confidentiality clause excludes objects or types of information that 
a) have been developed or are being developed by the receiving Party independently of the 
information; 
b) are part of the generally accessible state of technology or that reach this status without the fault 
of the receiving Party or 
c) were already in the possession of the receiving Party at the time of the announcement. 
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Article 12 Written Form 
All additions and modifications to this Agreement, which will be numbered consecutively, shall be duly 
signed by both parties prior to affecting any of the changes therein contained. No addition or 
modification of this Agreement shall be effective or binding on either of the parties hereto unless 
agreed in writing and duly signed by the parties. 
Article 13 Severability Clause 
If any part of this Agreement shall be or become invalid, then it shall be replaced by that valid 
regulation which comes closest to its meaning and intention. All other parts of this disclaimer shall 
remain valid in that case. 
Article 14 Entry into Force 
This Agreement shall enter into force on […date…]. 
Article 15 Termination/Modification/Review 
(1) The agreement will terminate on […date…]. 
(2) By way of exception, this Agreement can be terminated […] 
(3) The agreement can be amended at any time by mutual consent of the parties documented in 
writing. Any such amendment shall be deposited according to Art. 16 of this Agreement and enter 
into force one month after the date of the deposit. The par-ties will review this agreement at least 
once every three years to determine whether it should be revised, renewed [or cancelled]. 
Article 16 Depositary 
(1) [Member State X] shall act as the Depositary of the Agreement. 
(2) The original of the Agreement, in the […] languages, each version being equally authentic, shall 
be deposited with the Depositary. The Depositary shall transmit certified copies of each of these 
versions to the Parties which have signed the Agreement. 
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APPENDIX D: Alternative Template Agreement 
for a statistical transfer between Belgium and 
the Netherlands (if not included in the Joint 
Project Agreement) 
Agreement between 
Belgium, in the following referred to as “the selling Member State” 
and 
The Netherlands, in the following referred to as “the buying Member State” 
on 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FRAMEWORK FOR 
THE STATISTICAL TRANSFER OF ENERGY FROM RENEWABLE SOURCES 
FOR TARGET COMPLIANCE PURPOSES UNDER DIRECTIVE 2009/28/EC GENERATED IN THE 
JOINT PROJECT OFFSHORE WINDPARK  
AS WELL AS THE PHYSICAL TRANSFER OF THE RESPECTIVE ENERGY 
Preamble 
[…] 
Part 1OBJECTIVE AND DEFINITIONS 
Article 1 Objective 
(1) The objective of this Agreement is to provide a legal framework for the implementation of 
statistical transfers under Art. 6 of Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and 
amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (hereafter: Directive 
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2009/28/EC). 
(2) The Parties enter into this Agreement with the purpose of  
a) contributing to the cost-efficient achievement of the EU target to increase the share of energy 
from renewable sources to 20 percent by 2020; 
b) optimise the balance of benefits from statistical transfers of renewable energy target amounts for 
both the buying and the selling Member State; 
c) create broad public acceptance with regard to statistical transfers 
d) [… additional points] 
Article 2 Definitions 
Pursuant to the Agreement the following terms are defined as 
a) Selling Member State: a Member State of the European Union which, as a party to this Agreement, 
intends to transfer the renewable energy target amounts to the buying Member State according to 
this agreement; 
b) Buying Member State: a Member State of the European Union which, as a party to this Agreement, 
intends to receive the renewable energy amounts for target compliance purposes under Directive 
2009/28/EC from the selling Member State; 
c) Directive 2009/28/EC: Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and 
subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC; 
d) Renewable energy target amount: the statistical value of energy from renewable sources as 
reported for the purpose of compliance with the mandatory national targets for the share of energy 
from renewable sources in final energy consumption as set out in the third column in part A of Annex 
I to the Directive 2009/28/EC; 
e) Joint Project: the project identified, constructed and exploited in accordance with the Joint Project 
Agreement;  
f) Joint Project Agreement: the Agreement of … [here to be referred to the Agreement above – 
possibly also in Annex.] 
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g) Joint Project Operator: the developer and operator of the Joint Project identified, constructed and 
exploited in accordance with the Joint Project Agreement;  
h) National support scheme: according to Art. 2 lit. k) of the Directive 2009/28/EC any instrument, 
scheme or mechanism applied by a Member State or a group of Member States, that promotes the 
use of energy from renewable sources by reducing the cost of that energy, increasing the price at 
which it can be sold, or increasing, by means of a renewable energy obligation or otherwise, the 
volume of such energy purchased; 
g) … 
Part 2KEY OBLIGATIONS 
Article 3 Cooperation 
(1) The Parties shall at all times co-operate in order to establish and maintain the necessary and 
favourable conditions for the implementation of the statistical transfer. 
(2) National contact points are established to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement and 
deal with any matters arising in the course of the implementation. The contact point of the selling 
Member States will be [xx]. The contact point of the buying Member State will be [yy]. 
Article 4 Obligations of the Parties 
(1) The selling Member State grants the right to use 30% of the production from the Joint Project for 
the achievement of its target under the Directive 2009/28/EC.  
(2) If the buying Member State intends to exercise this option, the selling Member State shall be 
notified immediately. The buying Member State takes the necessary measures to allow the 
participation of the Joint Project in its national support scheme.  
(3) When the production from the Joint Project has won a contract, the buying Member State 
immediately notifies the selling Member State. The selling Member State thereupon undertakes to 
notify the statistical transfer of the respective 30% of the production of the Joint Project to the 
European Commission within the deadline set out in Article 6 paragraph 2 of Directive 2009/28/EC. 
(4) The buying Member State guarantees for the operational support for the 30% of the production 
from the Joint Project in accordance with the terms of its own national support scheme. Those 30% 
of the production shall not be eligible for support in the selling Member State anymore, neither during 
the duration of the support by the buying Member State, nor after the end of such support. The 
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buying Member State pays the operational support owed in accordance with the terms of its own 
national support scheme directly to the Joint Project Operator. There is no obligation of the buying 
Member State to make any payments to the selling Member State.  
(5) The selling Member State allows for the physical transfer of the production which has won a 
contract under the national support scheme of the buying Member State to the buying Member State 
over the existing interconnector between the selling Member State and the buying Member State. In 
this context, the following obligations apply:  
a) the selling Member State shall guarantee and provide for the grid enforcement for all grids within 
its national territory as in accordance with its national legislation;  
b) the selling Member State shall guarantee and provide for all the enforcements necessary with 
regard to the interconnection capacity needed for the transfer to the buying Member State; 
c) the buying Member State shall guarantee and provide for the grid enforcement for all grids within 
its national territory; 
d) the costs which are, according to the legislation of the respective Member State, to be passed on 
to the user of the grid shall be borne by the Joint Project Operator and shall be considered within the 
price for which the production from the Joint Project is offered in the procedure for awarding support 
in the national support scheme of the buying Member State.   
Physical transfers shall be made in real time, as in accordance with the production from the Joint 
Project.  
Part 3 SPECIFICATIONS AND NOTIFICATION OF STATISTICAL TRANSFERS 
Article 5 Specifications of Statistical Transfers 
(1) This Agreement covers the statistical transfer of 30% of the production of the Joint Project if the 
buying Member State has notified the selling Member State of the exercise of the option in 
accordance with Art. 4 of this agreement, and under the condition that such production is able to win 
a contract under the national support scheme of the buying Member State. It only applies if and to 
the extent the electricity produced in the Joint Project wins such a contract. However, in such case it 
applies automatically, with the buying Member State being obliged to pay for and the selling Member 
State being obliged to transfer the respective production.  
(2) Contracts in the buying Member State are awarded periodically. The buying Member State shall 
allow the production from the Joint Project participation in the award procedure on equal terms as 
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electricity produced in the buying Member State.  
(3) The concrete amount of electricity to be statistically transferred as in accordance with this 
agreement depends on the actual production of the Joint Project. For the production to be 
transferred, such transfers shall be made annually.  
Article 6 Notification to the European Commission 
(1) Statistical transfers as agreed between the Parties, shall be notified by the selling Member State 
to the European Commission according to Art. 6 paragraph 2 of the Directive 2009/28/EC, specifying 
the exact amount of energy from renewable sources to be statistically transferred from the selling 
Member State to the buying Member State for each relevant calendar year measured in ktoe, as well 
as the corresponding price paid by the buying Member State. As in accordance with Art. 4(3) of this 
Agreement, there is no compensation for the selling Member State, the notification shall state that a 
price of 0 Euro was paid.  
(2) A copy of this notification shall be sent to the buying Member State's contact point at least a 
month in advance of the deadline provided for in Article 6 paragraph 2 of Directive 2009/28/EC. The 
buying Member State shall notify the Commission of its agreement with the statistical transfer within 
the deadline of Article 6 paragraph 2 of Directive 2009/28/EC.6 
(3) To facilitate the European Commission's task of monitoring the overall progress of implementation 
of and compliance with Directive 2009/28/EC the Parties will also notify the Commission of the overall 
content of the agreement in particular including the amounts to be transferred during the entire time 
period of the Agreement, possible options for additional transfers and price adaptation arrangements 
within a month after the coming into force of this agreement. 
Part 4OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES 
Article 7 Responsibilities in case of non-compliance 
(1) The Member States as project parties assume the responsibility for any failure or refusal to 
perform their obligations under this Agreement other than for reasons of force majeure according to 
Art. 9 of this Agreement. 
(2) In case of non-compliance with any obligation under this Agreement a party is obliged to 
compensate the injured party fully for any damages incurred due to the non-compliance. 
(3) The payment of such damages shall not limit the right to seek further compensation under the 
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Agreement or otherwise. 
Part 5GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 8 Relationship between this Agreement and other International Obligations 
Nothing in this Agreement shall derogate from the rights or obligations of any State under any 
relevant international treaty or rule of international law. 
Article 9 Force Majeure 
(1) Responsibility for non-performance or delay in performance on the part of any Party to this 
Agreement with respect to any obligations or any part thereof under this Agreement, other than an 
obligation to contribute financially, shall be suspended to the extent that such non-performance or 
delay in performance is caused or occasioned by Force Majeure, as defined in this Agreement. 
(2) Force Majeure shall be limited to: 
a) Natural disasters (earthquakes, landslides, cyclones, floods, fires, lightning, tidal waves, volcanic 
eruptions and other similar natural events or occurrences); 
b) War between sovereign States where the relevant State has not initiated the war under the 
principles of international law, acts of terrorism, sabotage, rebellion or insurrection; 
c) International embargoes against States other than the relevant State, provided, in every case, that 
the specified event or cause of the above mentioned types and any resulting effects preventing the 
performance by the relevant State of its obligations, or any part thereof, are beyond the relevant 
State’s control. 
(3) If a Party to this Agreement is prevented from carrying out its obligations or any part thereof 
under this Agreement (other than an obligation to pay money) as a result of Force Majeure, it shall 
notify in writing the other affected Parties to which performance is owed. The notice must: 
a) Specify the obligations or part thereof that cannot be performed; 
b) Fully describe the event of Force Majeure; 
c) Estimate the time during which the Force Majeure will continue; and 
d) Specify the measures proposed to be adopted to remedy or abate the Force Majeure. 
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Following this notice, and for so long as the Force Majeure continues, any obligations or parts thereof 
which cannot be performed because of the Force Majeure, other than the obligation to pay money, 
shall be suspended. 
Article 10 Dispute Settlement 
(1) Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating exclusively to this Agreement, or the 
breach, termination or invalidity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
(2) The following conditions will apply: 
a) The appointing authority shall be … [name of institution or person]; 
b) The number of arbitrators shall be ... [one or three]; 
c) The place of arbitration shall be ... [town and country]; 
d) The language to be used in the arbitral proceedings shall be [...]. 
Article 11 Confidentiality 
(1) The Parties to this Agreement are committed to confidentiality against third parties for all 
information and objects that are not to be notified to the European Commission according to Art. 6 of 
the Agreement or have not been otherwise published and are conveyed in confidence by any other 
Party. The receiving Party shall not use any such information or objects for any purpose other than in 
accordance with the terms of this Agreement. The disclosure of confidential information or objects 
requires the express written consent by the conveying Party. 
(2) The confidentiality clause excludes objects or types of information that 
a) have been developed or are being developed by the receiving Party independently of the 
information; 
b) are part of the generally accessible state of technology or that reach this status without the fault 
of the receiving Party or 
c) were already in the possession of the receiving Party at the time of the announcement. 
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Article 12 Written Form 
All additions and modifications to this Agreement, which will be numbered consecutively, shall be duly 
signed by both parties prior to affecting any of the changes therein contained. No addition or 
modification of this Agreement shall be effective or binding on either of the parties hereto unless 
agreed in writing and duly signed by the parties. 
Article 13 Severability Clause 
If any part of this Agreement shall be or become invalid, then it shall be replaced by that valid 
regulation which comes closest to its meaning and intention. All other parts of this disclaimer shall 
remain valid in that case. 
Article 14 Entry into Force 
This Agreement shall enter into force on […date…]. 
Article 15 Termination/Modification/Review 
(1) The agreement will terminate on […date…]. 
(2) By way of exception, this Agreement can be terminated […] 
(3) The agreement can be amended at any time by mutual consent of the parties documented in 
writing. Any such amendment shall be deposited according to Art. 16 of this Agreement and enter 
into force one month after the date of the deposit. The parties will review this agreement at least 
once every three years to determine whether it should be revised, renewed [or cancelled]. 
Article 16 Depositary 
(1) [Member State X] shall act as the Depositary of the Agreement. 
(2) The original of the Agreement, in the […] languages, each version being equally authentic, shall 
be deposited with the Depositary. The Depositary shall transmit certified copies of each of these 
versions to the Parties which have signed the Agreement. 
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